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Abstract  
Single-party dominance (SPD) is a phenomenon that has puzzled many scholars within the field 
of political science, as it does not fit into the standard dichotomy of democracy versus dictatorship. 
Kenneth Greene’s Resource Theory seeks to explain prolonged electoral dominance in these 
systems by looking at resource asymmetries between the governing party and the opposition. 
Greene applies his theory to democratic and non-democratic SPD systems alike. In order to 
expand knowledge in the field of SPD research, this thesis has provided a critical analysis of 
Greene’s theory using South Africa under the ANC within the timeframe of 1994 to February 2018 
as an illustrative case.  
The thesis concluded that the Resource Theory could not be used for explaining ANC dominance, 
and indicated that resources have a limited power to explain SPD. As such, the aim of the thesis 
is to uncover theoretical weaknesses of the theory. Firstly, it is argued that the theory is weakened 
by the use of subjective and sometimes arbitrary concepts which hamper testability. The main 
theoretical flaw identified is Greene’s assumptions of the nature of such systems, in which he sees 
the dominant party as one unit. I argue in this research that this assumption renders the theory 
unable to predict the consequences of factionalisation within the dominant party. Three main 
factors are identified to justify why resources have limited explanatory power. Firstly, 
factionalisation leads to intra-party competition for state resources, and these factions become 
dependent on a steady stream of resources to sustain themselves. This competition can become so 
fierce that the economy suffers. When resources become less available, these conflicts intensify. 
Consequently, the dominant party starts deteriorating from within and misconduct can no longer 
be concealed from the public. As the government becomes less responsive in terms of providing 
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public goods in combination with increased public awareness, voter dissatisfaction also 
intensifies. This eventually leads citizens to abandon their allegiance to the party. The research 
study shows that resources are not independent from external and internal environments, 
indicating that asymmetric resource advantages alone cannot explain why these systems exist over 
longer periods of time.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Research Study 
1.1 Introduction  
Single-party dominance (SPD) is a phenomenon that has puzzled many scholars. As proclaimed 
by T.J. Pempel, “What makes long-term rule by a single political party [..] an enticing puzzle is 
not just that it is rare but that it is not supposed to happen. And the puzzle becomes more tantalizing 
the longer the period of uninterrupted single-party rule lasts (1990:5)”. Many scholars have 
focused on the causes and consequences of such systems (Brooks, 2004:1, Schleiter and Voznaya, 
2014:675, Lodge, 1999:1, Forestiere and Allen, 2011:381, Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005:238). 
Kenneth F. Green proposes a theory to explain why certain parties persist in power for decades, as 
well as their eventual demise (2007a:3).  
Greene argues that existing theories within the rational choice paradigm overpredict opposition 
party competitiveness and that are unable to explain why SPD exists. Greene’s (2007a:3-5) 
Resource Theory, derived from a rational choice model, aims to fill the gap in existing rational 
choice theories. At the core of his theory lies the notion that a dominant party’s advantages are 
twofold, the first being that dominant parties enjoy considerable resources advantages, which 
raises the cost of participation for opposition parties (Greene, 2007a:3-5) . His initial work focused 
on Mexico’s dominant party authoritarian regime, but he later argued that the fundamental 
elements of the theory could be extended to all dominant party regimes, authoritarian and 
democratic alike (Greene, 2010a:45).  
Published in 2010, Greene stated that South Africa, under the ANC, had just become dominant as 
the party had reached the four-election threshold (2010a:23, 50-51). For those parties that had not 
yet reached the longevity threshold to be considered dominant, but encompass all the other 
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characteristics, Greene uses the term  “proto-dominant party system” (2010a:23, 50-51). However, 
he asserts that his theory would most probably become applicable to South Africa (Ibid).  
This thesis will take the form of a theory-testing case study, using the South African case under 
the ANC from the transition from authoritarianism in 1994 to the end of former President Zuma’s 
second term in 2018. The aim of this thesis is to assess the validity of Greene’s Resource Theory 
in the South African context.  
1.2 Preliminary Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
As stated in the opening quote of this chapter, one-party dominance is not supposed to exist at all 
(Pempel, 1990:5), and its existence was often disregarded in early political science literature. For 
example, studies which classify regimes within the dichotomy of ‘democracies’ or ‘dictatorships’, 
tend to not recognise SPD regimes (Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003). Among those scholars 
who recognise SPD systems, they disagree upon a range of issues. Firstly, scholars disagree upon 
the operationalisation of the term. Moreover in studies devoted to the topic of SPDs, there is little 
consensus on what causes and sustains and them, and their effects on democratic consolidation.  
In defining SPD systems, there needs to be a differentiation between SPD systems and one-party 
authoritarian regimes. For Pempel (1990:1) the vital distinction is the character of their democratic 
components, such as freedom of political association, free electoral competition and ‘relatively’ 
open information systems (Ibid). Alan Arian and Samuel H. Barnes (1974:593) argue that the 
distinction lies in two basic criteria of contestation and participation, as set out by Robert A. Dahl 
who stated, “since it is more than one party to compete, it is certainly democratic in the procedural 
sense. And since […] it mobilizes the modal citizens of a society, it can be said to be substantively 
democratic as well” (1986:5). However, Pempel (1990:1) claims that these systems are stark 
13 
 
deviations from the expected norm of competitive democracy as they exhibit a lack of alternation 
of power over extensive time periods. For Greene (2010a:20) dominant party systems present a 
special type of system, as most nations across the world either fall into the category of fully 
competitive democracies where the rotation of power happens on a regular basis or fully closed 
authoritarian regimes where undemocratic tools guarantee that turnover does not happen. The third 
category, which is less common, is a dominant party system where a party stays in government for 
two to seven decades, where officeholders do not win by outcome-changing electoral fraud (Ibid). 
SPD systems baffle scholars for a number of reasons. As Scheiner asserts, even in times of 
considerable dissatisfaction towards the ruling party there can still be cases where opposition 
parties do not win elections (2006:13). Often the election outcome is predicted before election day, 
which leads Greene to ask why these systems have opposition parties at all, instead of turning into 
authoritarian one-party regimes (2007a:3).   
A number of scholars consider SPD systems to be a distinct category unsuitable within the 
democracy-authoritarian dichotomy. However, these scholars represent different views on the 
definitions and operationalisation of the term. Vagueness and sometimes arbitrary definitions have 
come under criticism by some scholars (Bogaards, 2004:192; Caulier and Dumont, 2005:2; 
Dunleavy, 2005:3-6). The origin of the term was first coined by Maurice Duverger (1963:308-9), 
according to whom: 
“[A] party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, 
methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch […] Domination is a 
question of influence rather than of strength: it is also linked with belief. A dominant party 
is that which public opinion believes to be dominant.”    
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Those who adhere to the teachings of Duverger (1964:308) agree with his emphasis on ideological 
domination, but they take his starting point and add an electoral component. Duverger saw 
dominance not just as the strength of a certain party, but its influence as well. Pempel (1990:6) 
adds that the party is able to dictate the policy sphere and takes a privileged position as norm-
setter, and its position is recognised by all the political parties and the general public. Giliomee 
and Simkins (1999:4) point to how the party is able to shape both society and the political system 
through its privileged position. Forestiere and Allen (2011:381) argue that the fusion of the party 
and the state allows the party to establish certain ideas within the political sphere, which sets the 
agenda for political action and solutions. The ideas of the party become social norms, which 
become increasingly entrenched and immutable over time.  
The opponents of definitions such as Duverger’s not only resist operationalisation, but also have a 
strong tendency to mix descriptive indicators of SPD itself with indicators of its presumed causes 
or effects, hence they preclude the testing of related casual hypotheses (Schneider and Abdedi, 
2006:2). To escape this problem, more recent literature has held consensus on a ‘generic’ definition 
- in a dominant party regime, one and the same party controls government over an extended period 
of time, whether alone or as the most powerful party of a coalition (Schneider and Abdedi, 2006:2; 
Boucek, 1998:103; Cox, 1998:238; Weaver and Rockman, 1993:20).  
Greene’s (2010a:22) definition of SPD systems is found within the more ‘generic’ category. He 
provides us with a set of rules to distinguish dominant party systems from those with more regular 
democratic turnover in government, and from those where electoral dominance is epiphenomenal 
because fully closed authoritarian rule makes turnover through elections impossible. For him, 
“dominant party systems are polities with meaningful elections in which one party maintains the 
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ability to determine social choice through government policy for at least 20 consecutive years or 
four consecutive elections”. Meaningful elections, according to his definition, are when opposition 
parties are permitted to contest for power, and where there is an absence of outcome-changing 
fraud without which another party would have won the election (Ibid).   
The temporal criteria laid out by Greene and other scholars do, however, raise some concerns. 
Different scholars have widely diverging temporal cut-off points. O’Leary’s (1994:4) argues that 
for a party to be classified as a SPD system, a party would need to be in office for ten years, 
whereas for Blondel (1968) it is twenty years. Pempel’s (1990:1-2) threshold is “three to five 
decades”, whilst Dunleavy’s assertion that it is ten, twelve, or more successive governments (2005: 
7). Bogaard (2004:175) and Sartori (1976:196,199) argue for a minimum of three consecutive 
terms. These discrepancies also leave us with the question of an appropriate threshold as countries 
have different electoral systems and election cycles. Another key issue is whether dominance ends 
if the dominant party loses an election. Sartori (1976:196) argues that dominance ends after one 
electoral defeat, while Pempel (1990:335) and others allow for occasional and short absences from 
power that are followed by the party’s rejuvenation and another longer period of dominance, as in 
the case of Sweden’s Social Democrats (Schneider and Abedi, 2006:13). One of the major 
concerns with the varying definitions of temporal dominance is the possibility of setting the criteria 
for one’s own researchable purposes. For instance, Schneider and Abedi critique O’Leary’s 
definition for being solely motivated by labelling the British Conservatives after 1979 as dominant, 
without providing a sufficient theoretical rationale or empirical grounding (2006:13).  
Greene argues that one may use the same logic to explain the persistence of authoritarian and 
democratic one-party dominance systems (2007a:259). The focus of Greene’s early work was 
dominant party authoritarian regimes in Mexico. In his later work he claimed that the theory works 
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for both democratic and authoritarian SPD systems (2010a:45). Both categories of dominant party 
gain control over the legislature and executive branches for many years, even though they hold 
regular and at least partially free and fair elections, where contending parties may compete for all 
elected posts. The difference is that democratic SPD systems tend to not apply authoritarian 
controls and are more likely to ensure that the surrounding freedoms are commensurate with 
democracy, as with the operation of electoral institutions (Ibid).  
Beyond the debates surrounding definition and operationalisation are the debates concerning the 
causes of these systems, as well as their consequences for democracy. In terms of the 
consequences, Brooks (2004:1) expresses concern about how dominant party systems affect the 
‘quality’ of democracy and democratic consolidation. When a party faces little prospect of 
electoral defeat, there is potential for a decline in government response to public opinion, loss of 
accountability and the overall erosion of democratic principles and the development of 
authoritarian methods of rule (Ibid). Schleiter and Voznaya (2014:675) contend that a competitive 
party system helps curb corruption since it enables opposition parties to inform the electorate about 
corruption and provide them with a viable alternative to the dishonest incumbent. Suttner 
(2006:277) and Lodge (1999: 10), however, are wary of the conclusion that dominant party 
systems hamper democracy. Suttner (2006:277) critiques the tendency of some scholars to make 
alarming predictions of some countries all the while dismissing them in others, and this reflects 
the scholars’ ideological position rather than scholarship. For instance, few scholars have posed 
that the dominance of the Swedish Social Democrats was a major threat to democracy, while it is 
raised as problematic in Africa. For some scholars dominant parties are even desirable in some 
contexts. For example, Arian and Barnes perceive dominant parties as possible democratic forces 
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of stability in post-conflict societies (1974:592). For instance, The Indian Congress has at times 
been brought up as an example of this (Reddy, 2014:100).  
This thesis is most concerned with the factors that sustain one-party dominance. As Greene’s 
theory will be elaborated upon in detail in the next chapter, this literature review will only present 
it briefly. Greene’s (2007:33) theory is about a dominant party’s persistence and failure rather than 
the causation of dominance. He argues that there is a difference between the forces that cause one 
party dominance and the forces that sustain the system. For Greene, dominant party rule is 
sustained by the inherent “unfairness” of these systems as the dominant party is wealthier than the 
opposition, making opposition parties unable to compete (Greene, 2007a:5, 33). Another view, 
which does not directly oppose Greene’s argument but cannot explain long-term dominance as 
argued by Greene (2010a:50-51), is the role of liberation legacies. Duverger’s (1954:308) 
definition of party dominance, emphasises ideological domination, which led several scholars to 
argue that the definition included the cause of dominance (Schneider and Abdedi, 2006:2). For 
example, Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013:11) contend that in the context of Africa a number of 
the dominant parties were at the forefront of mobilising liberation struggles, and their liberation 
credentials, benefitted the dominant party in terms of votes. As such, the ideological position of 
the governing party is a cause of dominance.  
Greene recognises that former liberation movement dominant parties reap the benefits of positive 
public opinion due to the symbolic effect, but argues that this is not sustainable (2010a:50-51). 
Eventually, he argues that citizens will cast their votes based on performance rather than on 
historical legacy, albeit the timing will differ between countries (Ibid). Forestiere and Allen 
(2011:381) present a different view, arguing that liberation credentials alter the political system. 
They call this ‘cognitive locks’, in which the privileged position of the party leads to a fusion of 
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the party and the state, thereby leading to the dominant party’s ideas and practices becoming the 
norm in society. Over time, all political actors, as well as the majority of the population, accept 
these as the rule, and they become more entrenched and more challenging to undo (Ibid). For 
instance, Suttner argues that the prolonged rule of the Swedish Social Democrats has cemented 
the idea that a large welfare state with extensive benefits and high tax levels is the only suitable 
path for the country, and after their loss only minor modifications have been implemented 
(2003:283).     
While many scholars have concurred with a SPD puzzle, some have argued that these systems are 
different in an African context. Since the beginning of the 1990s, many African nations have 
adopted democratic rule, and many of these states have turned into dominant systems, which have 
lasted over extended periods of time (Doorenspleet and Nizjink, 2013:1; O’Brien; 2003:220, 
Bogaards, 2004:172). These scholars maintain that there is a high number of African countries 
with one-party dominant systems when compared to more established democracies (Ibid). The 
scholarly debates of African dominant systems often revolve around ‘African uniqueness’, 
assumed causes and consequences (Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005:400; Gilimoee and Simkins, 
1991:1).   
Mozaffar and Scarritt’s (2005:399) claim that there is an ‘African puzzle’. They state that Africa 
is unusual from a global perspective due to the overlapping of two characteristics: low ethno-
political fragmentation and high volatility in the political system. Their work examines elections 
in 34 African countries between 1980 and 2000 to assess how ethno-political cleavages and 
electoral institutions interact to determine party system size. They conclude that high levels of 
ethno-political fragmentation are likely to increase the number of political parties, while district 
magnitude reduces the number of effective electoral and legislative parties in Africa (Mozaffar 
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and Scarritt, 2005:238; 384). These findings contradict previous research on party systems 
conducted in other places in the world, which demonstrates that ethnic fragmentation and district 
magnitude both increase party system size (Duverger, 1954; Powell, 1982; Riker, 1982; Neto and 
Cox, 1997).  
These authors argue that voting behaviour in Africa is fundamentally different from the rest of the 
world. Van de Walle  claims that one specific feature of many African countries is the combination 
of political competition which exists alongside widespread clientelism, poor developmental 
performance, and programmatically weak parties (2003:297). Kitschelt and Wilkinson define 
clientelism as the “direct exchange of citizen’s vote in return for direct payment or continuing 
access to employment, goods and services” (2007: 2). This has led a number of scholars to assume 
that voters in new democracies vote based on ethnic factors (Burnell, 2001:34; Nugent, 2001:2; 
Posner, 2005:217) or entrenched clientelistic networks (Vincete and Wantchekon, 2010:16), as 
opposed to the effectiveness of politicians to deliver collective or public goods.  
In explaining what Mozaffar and Scarritt call the ‘African puzzle’ (2005:238,384) the authors 
argue that it is strategic choice, structured by the institutional legacies of authoritarian regimes in 
the formation and development of political parties, that explains contemporary single party 
dominance in post-colonial Africa. The authors state that the political restrictions present under 
authoritarian regimes produce information deficits concerning electoral mobilisation, strategic co-
ordination and collective action that typically attend party formation and coalition-building. Under 
these constraints, political parties tend to rely on presidential elections and ethno-political 
cleavages to sustain their support, instead of electoral coalition-building. For Mozaffar and Scarrit, 
this leads to the entry of many short-lived political parties, and the electoral and legislative 
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dominance of a small number of large parties. This can result in low party system fragmentation 
and high levels of volatility (2005:399). 
However, Mozaffar and Scarrit’s position has been challenged based on their study’s methodology 
and their conclusions. Bogaards (2008:125-130) argues that even though there are many instances 
of SPD in Africa, the notion that Africa is characterised by high volatility is flawed. He claims that 
the average level of electoral volatility is comparable to that seen in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe. As Mozzafar and Scarritt do not include regime type as a variable, the authors do not 
differentiate between democratic and non-democratic regimes. Therefore, Bogaards asserts that 
the volatility scores are higher than if they had only examined democratic states (2008:125-130). 
As such, although the volatility score is higher than that found in Western Europe, Africa is not 
“remarkable” when compared to other new democracies (Ibid).  
While the scholars mentioned above state that voting behaviour is different in Africa, this view 
has, itself been challenged. While many scholars have claimed that ethnicity and clientelism 
determine voting patterns on the continent, instead of the effectiveness of politicians in delivering 
collective or public goods, Weghorst and Lindberg argue there is little evidence for this 
(2013:717). Elections in a number of new African democracies have been shown to be increasingly 
competitive. Even in a SPD where one party continues to stay in power, there is a high turn-over 
in government positions. One example provided by the authors shows that the re-election rate of 
legislative seat holders is often above 50 per cent. As such, these authors argue that these findings 
are incompatible with ethnic and clientelistic explanations of voting behaviour (Ibid). In sum, 
clientelism alone cannot explain electoral outcomes and voting patterns in Africa are not 
significantly different from elsewhere. As in other places, voters in Africa judge their 
representatives on their ability to provide public goods, implement policies and foster economic 
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growth. In addition to the measures of direct performance by the incumbent, other factors that are 
standard in the literature on voting in established democracies, such as partisanship, level of 
education, and access to information all play a role (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013:730). Likewise, 
Suttner argues that the idea that Africans are more likely to base their vote on ethnicity over 
performance, is based upon racist perceptions of Africans within academia, and is simply untrue 
(2003:282). In the case of the ANC in South Africa, he argues that the citizens might at times be 
very dissatisfied with the pace of transformation, but there is an acceptance and understanding that 
these changes take time (Ibid).   
Patronage is central to Greene’s SPD theory. He dismisses Mozzafar and Scarritt’s (2005:384) 
argument that the persistence of dominant parties is due to irrationality as a consequence of 
information deficits. Unlike those arguing that dominant parties in Africa are fundamentally 
different from elsewhere, Greene (2010:25) maintains that all dominant parties rely on patrimonial 
exchanges to sustain themselves. Incumbency advantages affect opposition parties’ 
competitiveness in a number of ways, where the use of patronage is essential. His approach 
operates within a framework of rational choice theory, where macro-economic conditions and 
individual rationality interact (Greene, 2007a:5). Greene noted gaps in literature explaining DPSs, 
as standard theories of party competition tended to ignore resource asymmetries in these systems. 
As such, standard rational choice theories of party competition cannot account for the rationality 
of voter patterns in dominant parties, as the rules of the game are fundamentally different (Greene, 
2007a: 20,30). In sum, according to Greene, clientelistic exchanges are not a specific feature of 
African dominant party systems, but a necessary component of all dominant parties’ continued 
existence.   
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1.3 Research Questions  
The aim of this study is to evaluate Greene’s Resource Theory, by using South Africa under the 
ANC (April 1994- February 2018) as a case. The evaluation aims to contribute to theoretical 
improvements of SPD theory. The study will therefore be guided by the following focal research 
question:  
To what extent can Greene’s resource theory help to explain one-party dominance? In order to 
answer the main research question, two sub-questions will guide the research:  
A) To what extent does resource advantage help to understand the ANC’s electoral 
dominance?  
B) How does Greene’s theory address intra-party competition and the potential consequences 
thereof?  
1.4 Objectives and Relevance of Study 
As Pempel (1990:5) noted, one-party dominance represents a deviation from the norms of political 
parties, as most parties will fall operate in the context of either a democracy or dictatorship. As the 
literature review shows, there is little consensus as to why these systems exist, their consequences, 
what sustains them, and why they eventually break down. This necessitates improving upon 
existing theories, as well as establishing new ones. As Greene (2010a:20) argues, standard theories 
of party competition within the field of political science fall short in explaining the existence of 
one-party dominance, how they are sustained and why they eventually break down (Ibid).  
In Greene’s  research, he found South Africa under the ANC to be a deviant case, and he argues 
that it is very likely that the deviation is due to the ANC being a young dominant party (2010a). 
He states that we will have to observe a number of developments, which will be extensively 
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discussed throughout this thesis, in order for the ANC to remain the governing party (2010a: 50). 
Seeing that the ANC remains the governing party of South Africa as of 2019, I find it justified to 
reassess his theory. The aim of the thesis, is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the theory 
and to contribute to the field of dominant party research.  
1.5 Research Design and Methodology  
For the purposes of assessing Greene’s Resource Theory, one-party dominance under ANC rule 
from 1994 to February 2018 will be used as an illustrative case. It is a theory-confirming research 
project using South Africa as a case study. The research employs qualitative and supplementary 
quantitative data using a case study research design to address the research questions. I make use 
of explanatory research, which means “examining the reasons for, or associations between, what 
exists” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:27). Greene’s Resource Theory is the object of research; but I 
engage supplementary theories within political science literature. These supplementary theories 
will be used to critically analyse Greene’s theory. This approach will aid the research study to 
answer the main research question by taking a number of considerations into account.  
Yin writes that case studies explore a phenomenon, describe a situation, or test explanations (Yin, 
1981:97). A case study design can utilise both qualitative and quantitative data, however, it is more 
often related to qualitative research because it generates extensive in depth information on one 
particular case (Burnham et al., 2008:64).  
Lijphart’s identifies six different types of case studies, four of which are used for theory-building 
(1971, 691-693). Within these, we find the theory-confirming or theory-infirming case study, 
which analyses a single case within the framework of established generalisations. Theory-
confirming and theory-infirming case studies are implicitly comparative analyses. They focus on 
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one particular case out of a large number of cases and the theoretical framework is applied to 
analyse the theory (Lijphart, 1971:691-693). Greene asserts that all dominant party systems that 
adhere to his definition of dominance will be able to be explained using Resource Theory, 
including South Africa under the ANC. This is why the research uses the ANC as its case to test 
the theoretical framework.    
1.6 Limitations  
Studying one-party dominance is hampered by a lack of consensus on the meaning of the term. 
Scholarly debates concerning thresholds for the required share of votes or years a party needs to 
be in power for it to be considered a dominant party are unsettled. As my research centres on 
Greene’s Resource Theory, I utilise his definition of one party dominance.  
Secondly, a number of concepts such as patronage, clientelism, and corruption are employed 
differently when used by different academics, and could potentially provide difficulty. These 
concepts will be explained in the following chapter. The concepts are clarified to show how the 
terms also overlap in meaning and inter-link. Beyond the challenges of conceptualisation and 
overlapping of themes, a third constraint is the available data available to test Greene’s theory 
against a case study to address the research question. Since many of the key themes of this thesis 
are related to unlawful governmental behaviour, there is a high level of secrecy. This is especially 
true when it comes to the topics of patronage employment (chapter 4) and State-owned Enterprises 
(chapter 5). This has direct consequences for giving precise assessments of the scale of corruption; 
nonetheless, the available literature is sufficient for assessing the overall trends.     
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1.7 Outline of the Research study  
Chapter two establishes the foundations for the research study by presenting the core tenets of 
Kenneth Greene’s Resource Theory. The reader will be introduced to variety of terms within 
political science which will be briefly discussed, such as clientelism, patronage, and the median 
voter theory. The aim of this chapter is, however, not to provide an in-depth analysis of the theory 
as this will be covered in the remaining chapters. Instead, the chapter seeks to provide a thorough 
understanding of the theory.    
Chapter three analyses the Resource Theory’s assumptions on policy appeals and whether there 
is value in explaining sustained one-party dominance. The chapter will be based on the theoretical 
framework set out in chapter two. This will be applied to the ANC as a governing party, with the 
importance of the party’s origin as a liberation movement also considered. Historical events and 
developments will be discussed in relation to each presidency: Mandela’s, Mbeki’s and Zuma’s. 
The chapter will elaborate upon the usefulness and applicability of a range of theoretical concepts 
within political science and their potential consequences for the Resource Theory. Moreover, the 
chapter will provide the necessary background knowledge of the ANC which will lay the 
foundation for the rest of the thesis.    
Chapter four analyses public sector patronage employment and control over labour unions for 
electoral dominance. Political science theories on patronage contracts will be presented, including 
the Resource Theory. The following section on the South African public sector will be guided by 
both quantitative data from the South African Reserve bank, as well as qualitative data to address 
the level of public sector politicisation. The role of labour unions will be discussed more generally, 
although the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) will be given special attention 
due to its historic alliance with the ANC and its role as the biggest labour union in the country. 
26 
 
The final section will be devoted to the potential negative implications of the public sector and 
labour unions on electoral dominance.  
Chapter five analyses the final and most important component of the Resource Theory: the 
diversion of public funds for political partisan purposes. Furthermore, the use of patronage 
employment as a means to financial gain will be a central theme. As such, the chapter aims to 
extend the argument from the previous chapter. State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) are used as a 
proxy for the magnitude of state control of the economy, as proposed by Greene. A historical 
background of how SOEs and procurement policies have been used as a political tool for upholding 
elite interests will be provided. Furthermore, the chapter will explain how institutional frameworks 
and regulations affect the role of the state. It will be argued that country-specific institutional 
choices within a context of seeming liberalisation uphold state control of the economy. The latter 
part of the chapter will be devoted to how the ANC has both benefited from and been severely 
disadvantaged by the use of patronage employment and the diversion of public funds. This will be 
discussed in relation to Greene’s theory, in which theoretical weaknesses will be identified.    
Chapter six offers a final analysis and conclusions on the explanatory power of resources for 
prolonged dominat party rule. The findings of each chapter are incoprorated and used as the basis 
for the idenification of theoretical weaknesses. The final section provides a short elaboration on 
areas for further research.  
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Chapter 2: Kenneth Greene’s Resource Theory 
2.1Introduction  
As stated by Jonathan Kirshner (2003:645):  
“Money is everything. Money is nothing. Money is what you think it is. Money is power. Money is 
politics. Individually these statements underscore why monetary phenomena have such a strong 
formative influence on the nature of contemporary politics”. 
 
As money is at the core of a well-run political system, Butler (2010:237) argues that the connection 
between politics and money poses complex challenges for democracies around the world. Money 
is an essential part of politics as democratic parties need to organise and educate citizens, develop 
public policy, as well as run campaigns to win elections. Moreover, in countries where there is 
asymmetrical access to private and public resources, the dominant party may be able to secure an 
undesirable stranglehold over electoral politics (Ibid). Throughout Kenneth Greene’s academic 
career, one of his major interests has been the political consequences of asymmetric resource 
advantages in dominant party states and he contends that the combination of a politically controlled 
public sector and the use of public resources for partisan purposes sustains dominance. While 
uneven access to resources affects politics, these effects are not always straightforward. This 
chapter presents the key components and arguments of Greene’s Resource Theory, which lays the 
basis for the following chapters.  
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2.2  Resource Theory: Core Tenets  
The basis of Greene’s Resource Theory is how dominant parties’ resource advantages make 
opposition parties unable to compete. Hence, he argues that there is a positive  correlation between 
resources and dominance (Greene, 2007a:5, 259; 2010a:20). While the ruling party in fully 
competitive democracies can yield incumbency advantages through extra fundraising capacity and 
the perquisites of office, which helps them achieve the goal of re-election, in SPD these advantages 
are so unfairly high that we can think of them as hyper-incumbency advantages (Greene, 2010a:25-
26). He argues that with less expectation for rotation in government it changes the rules of the 
game in significant ways. In fully competitive democracies the alternation of power diminishes 
the politicians’ wish to systematically skew the competition to their advantage, unless there is the 
possibility of creating a cartel-like agreement with the opposition. On the other hand, the absence 
of rotation in SPD produces quasi-permanent resource asymmetries between those in power and 
those not and hence, these asymmetries go unchallenged. With few hindrances to the incumbent 
using funds at their sole discretion, public money may be diverted for party-building and perennial 
campaigning (Ibid). In addition, he argues that contrary to fully democratic regimes, within a SPD 
paradigm, advantages are party-specific rather than individual-specific, hence benefiting all 
members of the dominant party above all those in the opposition (Greene, 2010a:25-26). In sum, 
the core of his argument is that dominant parties continue to win due to their advantage that tilts 
the playing-field in their favour, thereby making elections biased (Greene, 2007a:259). 
2.2.1 Control Over the State Apparatus  
In Greene’s (2010a:25-26) work, control of the government apparatus is viewed as a cornerstone 
for the dominant party to enrich itself; however, this necessitates a politically controlled public 
bureaucracy. In these systems there tends to be an emphasis on political connections rather than 
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merit within all spheres of government (Ibid). Central to this claim the term “gatekeepers”, which 
can be summed up in Aidt’s (2016:44) definition of gatekeepers: government officials and 
politicians who regulate those who can gain access to rents. Greene (2010a:25-16) states that 
bureaucrats are less likely to take on the role of gatekeepers to the public budget within in a context 
where the ‘party’ has been fused with the state, as this creates an acceptable setting for the 
incumbent to divert public resources for partisan political purposes. In sum, having a political 
controlled bureaucracy is essential for obtaining resources (Ibid). 
2.2.2 The Control of National Resources  
Greene (2010a:25) argues that money is at the core of a number of activities that ensure the 
dominant party has already won before the polls even open. The party can use politicised public 
resources, as dominant parties can approve targeted legislation to distribute resources to their 
constituencies. There are five sources of illicit public resources that play a major role in skewing 
the political playing field, Greene argues (Ibid).  
1) One of the most vital sources is the diversion of funds from the budgets of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), which are usually located in strategic industries such as energy, 
telecommunications, manufacturing and transport. These large companies become easy targets for 
the extraction of funds without the information being made public. Individuals can be both high-
level political appointees as well as directors within the company. Moreover, their finances tend 
to be hidden from the public eye and transfers from the state are both numerous and hard to track. 
As there is a high level of secrecy, the incumbent can amass public funds for partisan use and 
purchase political support (Greene, 2007a:40).  
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2) Money can be channelled to the dominant party directly from the public budget through secret 
line items controlled by the executive branch and hidden legislative allocations that only legislators 
from the dominant party can access.  
3) Public sector employment is another major source of patronage. Large numbers of employment 
opportunities can be given to supporters and withheld from opponents.  
4) The centrality of the state in the economy encourages businesses to exchange kickbacks and 
sometimes illicit campaign contributions for economic protection (Greene, 2007a:40).  
5)  Large amounts of non-convertible administrative state resources are made available by public 
employees. Some examples of such resources are office supplies, vehicles, phones, and postage, 
which aid informing, persuading, and mobilising supporters. Greene argues that these five sources 
of resources transform public agencies into campaign headquarters (2007a:40).  
Apart from public funds, private party financing also plays a vital role in maintaining party 
dominance (Greene, 2010a:26-27).  Private donors are most likely to donate after making strategic 
calculations based on whatever generates the most personal benefits at the lowest cost. Moreover, 
the nature of SPD alters what is rational for those donors. In fully competitive democracies, the 
rotation of power encourages donors to spread their donations among many parties, even those 
unlikely to win, as long as costs of doing so are small. In dominant systems, physical or economic 
reprisal from the dominant party for supporting the opposition may be high and it is thus irrational 
for donors to give significant backing to opposition parties (Greene, 2010a:26-27). Moreover, 
while public party financing schemes have the potential to level the political playing field, the 
dominant party will make sure these are ineffective. Unless external forces have weakened the 
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incumbent, campaign finance regulations will be either minimal, non-existent, or favour the 
governing party (Ibid).  
2.2.3 Clientelism, Patronage and Corruption as Enabling Single Party Dominance 
As stated earlier, clientelism is defined as the direct exchange between citizens’ votes and direct 
payment or continuing admission to jobs, goods and services (Kitschelt and Wilkionson, 2007:2). 
Patronage is viewed by many scholars as a sub-category of clientelism. Wade defines patronage 
as “moneyless corruption”: it is where political authority figures insert friends, family members 
and/or political supporters into public jobs (1985:470). Personal connections are at the core of this 
system, as the person in question would not have access to the position without them. More 
explicitly, patronage can be seen as the power to control appointments to office or the right to 
privileges. This definition excludes the exchange of goods and services, and explicitly focuses on 
employment and privileges within the working sphere. While Greene uses the term patronage in 
his work, the operationalisation is very similar to the way that ‘clientelism’ is used. He describes 
patronage as a “vote-buying strategy that involves office-holders’ targeted and partisan distribution 
of public resources for electoral support” (Greene, 2007a:40). In his definition, patronage is not 
only restricted to public resources but encompasses all public resources, broadly defined including 
patronage employment (Ibid). With these small but distinct differences in terminology, I use the 
terms ‘clientelism’ and ‘patronage’ interchangeably. Unless clearly stated, I regard both 
clientelism and patronage as including all three components of goods, services and employment 
in exchange for citizens’ votes or other forms of political/party loyalty.  
Another important differentiation is ‘corruption’ versus ‘clientelism/patronage’ (Singer, 2009:2). 
While clientelism and corruption overlap, they are not identical. Corruption is understood to be 
the misuse of public office for private benefit. Many forms of corruption cannot be considered 
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clientelism. One example might be when a politician moves funds from the public budget into 
his/her own pocket for the sole purpose of enriching him/herself (Singer: 2009: 2). The exchange 
component is missing in this case and is therefore not equivalent to clientelism. Furthermore, while 
vote-buying and patronage-hiring may be unlawful, and are thus corrupt, other forms of clientelism 
are not considered illegal. Officeholders who assist individuals to obtain welfare benefits to which 
the person is not entitled are engaging in corrupt behaviour; assisting qualified individuals to 
receive benefits in the hopes of gaining their loyalty is not necessarily engaging in corruption. In 
other words, patron-client relationships are not necessarily corrupt, and corruption does not 
necessarily involve a patron-client relationship (Singer, 2009:2).    
Greene’s (2007a:40) argument that patronage leads to electoral support has a counter-intuitive feel 
to it, as one might wonder why citizens would not only tolerate clientelism and the often 
accompanied corruption, but also show support, albeit indirectly, for such action by casting their 
votes for a party that engages in exchanges like this. To grapple with Greene’s logic, De La O 
argues that perceived high levels of corruption amongst public officials make citizens more likely 
to conclude that there is widespread selling of votes in their community, and they are thus more 
willing to sell their own votes (2015:181). Her findings illuminate how citizens become more 
tolerant of government misconduct enabling public officials to strengthen their clientelistic 
networks. While perceived corruption may have a negative effect on citizens’ satisfaction with the 
political system and the political institutions, it does not necessarily discourage them from voting 
for the party providing patronage goods (Ibid). On the contrary, Martin and Solomon argue that 
uncontrollable spoils from state coffers increase voter dissatisfaction of the ruling party, resulting 
in electoral decay (2016:21-29). The following chapters will explore these debates further.  
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Another vital consideration is why citizens would uphold their part of the ‘deal’ by actually voting 
for the dominant party after they have already received the ‘benefit’ (Oliveros, 2017:37). The 
effectiveness of patronage is thus linked to compliance and scholars present different views. 
Scholars who adhere to an instrumentalist theory of clientelism argue that there needs to be 
sufficient monitoring of vote choices and the threat of sanctioning voters for non-compliance. As 
the distribution of benefits happens before election day, ‘clients’ are able to withhold their part of 
the ‘deal’ after receiving the payoff (Ibid). Therefore, from an instrumentalist framework, the 
patron must credibly threaten to withdraw subsequent benefits from individual voters who do not 
go through with their part of the deal. Oliveros argues that in practise, this would be impossible as 
the ‘patrons’ do not know which individuals did not vote for them, and hence, they cannot know 
which voters to sanction (2017:37). While, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Beatriz Magoloni and Berry R. 
Weingast reason that the incumbent can withhold funds from constituencies and since the 
opposition does not have the same amount of funds, citizens respond to that threat by voting for 
the dominant party (2003:11). They argue that this was the case in Mexico and helped sustain PRI 
rule (Ibid).    
On the other hand, Greene and Lawson (2014:62-63) argue for a norm-based approach to 
clientelism. They contend that there must be a psychological mechanism of reciprocal obligation. 
Specifically, they argue that the receipt of gifts, favours, services, or protection creates feelings of 
indebtedness and gratitude among voters, who, under certain conditions, spontaneously support 
their political patrons. For Greene and Lawson reciprocity is a fundamental element of human 
social interaction, and they argues that this element is universal (Greene and Lawson, 2014:62-
63). While cultural differences can affect the expression of reciprocal standards, humans across 
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the globe recognise norms of reciprocity at a very young age, and can therefore be considered 
‘hard-wired’, they argue (Ibid).   
Nevertheless, they argue that there are limitations of the power of obligation to ensure compliance 
(Lawson and Greene, 2014:64). To begin with, the value of a vote may vary across individuals, as 
wealthier citizens or citizens with intense partisan preferences will invoke a higher patronage cost 
for the incumbent. Furthermore, obligations stemming from reciprocity are bound to conflict with 
other obligations that could decrease the likelihood of compliance, for instance, the degree to 
which voters have embedded civic norms and respect for the law or for the representative 
institutions. In sum, voters become ‘clients’ when the demands of reciprocity outweigh other 
considerations (Ibid).  
2.3 The Role of Policy Appeals  
Greene (2007a:46) recognizes that patronage is itself is not sufficient to persuade voters, especially 
if the dominant party is completely out of touch with its people. Hence, he argues that the dominant 
party must be ideologically aligned with that of a large portion of the population (Greene, 
2007a:45). In this regard, Greene adhered to the median voter theory within the rational choice 
paradigm (Ibid). Within this school of thought, it is believed that politicians are rationally self-
interested actors and thus will try to locate which policies appeal to the median voter (Westley and 
Calagno: 2004:7). The median voter model states that politicians will in order to maximize their 
vote share present polices that appear as centrist or “middle of the road” as possible (Ibid). As 
such, the party will be able to attract those located slightly to the left and the right, while parties 
located on the extremes on either side of the spectrum entice less voters (Westley and Calagno: 
2004:7). While the advantage of the median voter theory is that it is firmly based in theory, it has 
been argued that it is severely disadvantaged in terms of testability (Branko: 2010:5). For a number 
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of reasons which will be elaborated upon in the following chapter, identifying the median voter 
might be an impossible task (Ibid).   
While Greene (2007a:45) reasons that the dominant party will locate itself close to the median 
voter, he also states that these policies can, at times, be unpragmatic; however, it heightens the 
dominant party’s legitimacy amongst the population and lowers the costs of patronage. Although 
dominant parties have little power to lessen abstention due to indifference towards their policy 
offers, abstention due to alienation can be controlled. However, both the indifferent voter and the 
voter who has been alienated might choose not to cast a vote because of the assumption that the 
dominant party will win. Hence, they see little reason to vote for an opposition party either 
(Greene, 2007a:46). While the dominant party has significant room to manoeuvre, unpopular 
polices may make patronage advantages unable to compensate for lost utility on policy, leading to 
a decreased number of votes. Nevertheless, Greene (2007a:46) argues that patronage is such a 
powerful tool that it is possible for the dominant party to win even if the opposition parties pursue 
the best strategies available to them.      
2.4 Cost of Participation  
Although, the role of opposition parties are beyond the scope of this thesis, for a comprehensive 
understanding of the Resource Theory the theoretical foundations must be presented. Greene 
(2010a: 28) argues that resource asymmetries in SPD systems disrupt the partisan playing field 
which reduces opposition parties to inefficient ‘vote gatherers’. On an individual level, running 
for office or being involved as a political activist involves personal costs. In this regard, the 
political system affects these costs. In fully competitive democracies, the costs are similar 
regardless of which political party one is representing, namely time and energy. In DPS, on the 
other hand, costs are asymmetrical and affect members of the opposition differently. For example, 
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activists involved in an opposing party pay great opportunity costs, as they tend to sacrifice 
stipends and material benefits related to the ruling party’s “old boys’” network (Greene, 2010a:27-
28).  
The reason Greene (2010a:28) provides for this is that the deep asymmetries and unlikelihood of 
rotation of power have certain consequences for opposition formation and composition. If we take 
the assumption that politicians’ primary goal is to win office, opposition parties should not exist. 
It is therefore a conundrum that they do. Greene reasons that potential activists recognise the 
opportunity costs, but those who greatly disapproves of the status quo is willing to make sacrifices 
for the sake of fighting for their beliefs (Ibid). Greene asserts that there is a small subset of 
politicians who value ideology over winning office, which explains why opposition parties form 
(2007a:5). Supporting this view, Harmel and Janda assert that all political parties have a number 
of aims, but that each party has a ‘primary goal’, which varies among parties and even within 
parties across time (1994:265). However, often, these individuals are deeply opposed to the ruling 
party, and locate themselves at the fringes of the political spectrum as niche parties, and are also 
bound to be irreconcilable with the preferences of the median voter, Greene argues (2007a:5; 
2010a:28; 2011:401). As the costs of being involved with an opposition party rise, the opposition 
parties themselves tend to radicalise even more as well as to decrease in size (Greene: 2007a:5; 
2010a:28; 2011:401). In the case of Mexico, Greene (2007a: 177) reasons that until the mid-1990s, 
National Action Party (PAN) took a rightwing pro-market position, while Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD) adopted a leftwing pro-state position, consequently being unaligned with the 
centrist preferences of the median voter. Greene further states that this heavy reliance on ideology 
can hamper intra-party co-operation and strategy, as well as make opposition parties unable to co-
ordinate amongst each other (2007a:60).  
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Greene also argues that opposition parties can be short on financial and human capital, compared 
to the ruling party, as they have significantly less access state resources and their lack of political 
power discourages private donors from providing funding (2007a:59). Consequently, they may be 
priced out of the media market, creating a situation where voters are less aware of them (Greene, 
2007a:59). If a challenger party is to communicate with the citizens at all, it must often take the 
form of an organisation that relies on volunteers to perform its daily tasks (Ibid). In sum, according 
to Greene, the strategies of opposition parties to gain power can often be futile as their resource 
poverty makes it almost impossible to win an election. The opposition becomes out-competed 
through advertising, out-staffed in canvassing and out-spent on patronage (Ibid).  
It is however important to note that different electoral systems reward smaller opposition parties 
differently. For instance, in proportional representation systems, such as in South Africa, smaller 
opposition parties may still get a seat in parliament and thus a paying job. Consequently, 
opportunity costs differ between the different systems.   
2.5 Greene’s Resource Theory on Why Dominance Ends  
To explain what terminates dominance, Greene (2007a:6) sees the opposition party change in 
response to a decreasing resource advantage of the incumbent following changes in the external 
environment, such as prolonged economic stagnation. Magaloni (2006:1) presents a similar theory 
of PRI dominance and downfall to Greene, the main difference being the catalyst of decline. She 
regards increased voter dissatisfaction in the face of economic crisis as the ultimate cause of 
dominant party decline. Although Greene (2007a:8) acknowledges that economic crisis increases 
voter dissatisfaction, he argues that it is not voter dissatisfaction in the face of economic crisis that 
terminates dominant party rule. Rather, it is the opposition parties’ ability to take advantage of this 
dissatisfaction that brings about the end (Greene, 2007a:8).  
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For Greene (2007a:8) this occurs when the dominant party has lost a significant amount of its 
advantages. External influences shape the character of opposition parties, and newcomers are more 
likely to be moderate due to changed external environments. However, the parties themselves are 
slow to change (Greene, 2007a:63). Co-ordination issues may persist even when the resource 
advantages of the dominant party have started to diminish. Greene therefore claims that opposition 
parties will see extensive generational conflicts within the party between the newcomers, who are 
more ideologically moderate, and the more ideologically extreme older generation. In a context in 
which the dominant party’s advantages diminish in a linear manner over time, for example through 
transitions from state-led to market-led economic development, those who have been involved 
with the party from its inception or over an extended period of time will hamper a transformation 
of the party into a centrist organization (Ibid). Greene (2007a:62) claims that the very process of 
opposition party building in SPD creates path-dependent inflexibilities in opposition party 
organisation, which becomes challenging to resolve. Greene asserts that often, the dominant party 
might be sustained for a period even after the mechanism that ensures its dominance has weakened 
(2007a:62). Supporting Greene’s argument, Harmel and Janda (1994:270) maintain that parties are 
naturally resistant to change, and in parties where the dominant group regards policy purity to be 
of higher importance than winning votes or gaining access to benefits of office, electoral failures 
and exclusion from government will not affect the party in a significant way.  
2.6 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter has been to explicate Greene’s Resource Theory, which will be analysed 
in the following chapters to test the validity of the Theory. This thesis seeks to answer whether his 
theory can explain single party dominance. In sum, the Resource Theory incorporates macro-
economic factors as well as individual rationality to explain single party dominance in democratic 
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states. He proposes a positive correlation between control over resources and continued electoral 
dominance, arguing that if a dominant party has unrestricted access to and usage of public 
resources it may use these resources for party-building and buying loyalty. For him, in these 
situations, opposition parties have limited means to challenge the incumbent. On the other hand, 
his theory claims that dominant parties will eventually lose when their resource advantages 
diminish, allowing opposition parties to become more competitive, and gain the opportunity to 
potentially defeat the incumbent.  
The following chapters cover three distinct elements of the Resource Theory, namely policy 
appeals, patronage employment, and State-Owned-enterprises (SOEs), which are conceptualised 
as a proxy for resources available to the ruling party, as proposed by Greene. Greene proposes that 
each of these variables prove a strong positive correlation between control over resources and the 
continuation of electoral dominance. The final chapter assesses the validity of the relationship. 
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Chapter 3: The Role of Policy Appeals in Sustaining 
Dominance  
3.1 Introduction 
Former leader of the ANC, Oliver Reginald Tambo, stated: 
“All revolutions are about state power. Ours is no exception. The slogan ‘power to the people’ 
means one thing and one thing only. It means we seek to destroy the power of the apartheid tyranny 
and replace it with popular power with a government whose authority derives from the will of all 
our people both black and white” (1984:4).    
The ANC was founded in 1912, making it one of the oldest liberation movements in the world. It 
is also the latest movement to attain its primary goal, namely to win political power (Wallerstein, 
1996:2694). Greene (2010b:247) proposes that dominant parties seek to skew the partisan playing 
field in order to sustain their power, but maintains that policy appeals are significant strategies to 
sustain the dominance and support of a single party within both an authoritarian and democratic 
context. Greene (2010b:247) claims that often, the dominant party will take a centrist position on 
policy to attract maximum vote counts and lessen patronage costs. By definition, centrist parties 
are parties that occupy left-right positions close to the meadian voter position (Ezrow, 2008:207). 
However, for Greene, resources are the main contributing factor to SPD, which provides the party 
with considerable space to manoeuvre in terms of policy appeals.  
While some scholars have strongly argued that the legacy of a liberation movement is an 
explanatory factor for sustained dominance, Greene (2010a:50) argues that the dominant party will 
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continue to face new social issues that face the younger generation. Hence, liberation movement 
legacy may play a significant role in the initial period of dominance, but cannot sustain dominance 
indefinitely (Greene, 2010a:50).  
Through an analysis of Greene’s argument regarding the role of policy appeals in sustaining 
dominance, I argue that the theory is to a large degree guided by ambiguous concepts impeding 
testability. As many of the assumptions are dependent on the resource argument, few conclusions 
can be made on how policy appeals effect electoral dominance. As such, I review these 
assumptions in relation to the ANC. The final section of the chapter seeks to address potential 
theoretical weaknesses, as well as important background knowledge of the ANC.  
3.2 Greene’s Policy Appeals Assumptions  
Briefly summarized from the previous chapter, Kenneth Greene (2007a:46) argues that dominant 
parties will take a centrist stand as this represents the preferences of the median voter. The model 
citizens of society are thus its firmest base of support, and the party spreads out widely from there 
to encompass as many people as possible. Policy appeals are important in two vital ways. Firstly, 
placing itself near the centre of the political spectrum heightens the dominant party’s legitimacy 
in terms of reflecting voters’ preferences. Secondly, this lowers the costs of patronage (Ibid). When 
a dominant party moves too far from ‘the centre’, it may discourage voters from voting for it, either 
by abstaining from voting or casting his/her vote for an opposition party. Nevertheless, patronage 
remains a powerful tool where the dominant party may be able to move quite far away from ‘the 
centre’ without significant decrease in electoral support (Ibid).  
Greene (2010a:50-51) does not completely disregard the importance of historical and symbolic 
legacies, but he does contend that they have an expiry date. Dominant parties which have emerged 
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in the aftermath of past political conflict, civil war or authoritarian rule may become a symbol for 
national unity (Ibid), as in the case of Botswana and South Africa (Karume, 2008:12). Despite this, 
Greene asserts that eventually citizens will judge the dominant party based on performance rather 
than on its historical legacy, thus a combination of resource advantages and policies vital for re-
election (2010a:50-51). The precise timing however will depend on each individual country case. 
He states that in some cases a resource advantage in combination with ‘acceptable’ policy appeals 
will be vital for the dominant party’s continuation of power early in its tenure, while in other 
countries, this happens later. In sum, although the party’s liberation legacy might have catalysed 
the initial party victory, this will eventually diminish. He further argues that in-depth country 
specific research is best suited for determining when this happens in that particular country. 
However, by his definition a party is only dominant after the four-election or 20 years threshold, 
making this the cut-off point for liberation legacies (2010a:50-51).  
3.3 The African National Congress (ANC) and Maintaining Party Dominance 
3.3.1 African National Congress (ANC) Electoral Dominance 
As Figure 1 reflects, the ANC has received a stable share of the votes in all past elections 
(Beresford, 2015:2). Until the 2009 elections, the margin of victory increased with each election, 
with the 2004 elections giving the ANC its biggest stronghold. However, 2014 witnessed the 
ANC’s weakest election results, both in terms of absolute percentage of votes being won and the 
smallest margin of victory. Having said this, the 2014 election results were not much lower for the 
ANC than what occurred in the 1994 elections. In conclusion, ANC dominance has remained 
stable. Schultz-Herzenberg highlights that while the ANC received fewer votes than ever before 
the 2014 elections, as of 2014 the party still controlled eight out of nine provinces and the 
opposition posed little threat to ANC dominance (2014:1). However, as of 2019 the party does not 
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have the same stronghold (Desai and Vahed, 2017:41). In the 2016 municipal elections the ANC 
received only 55 per cent of the votes, which is the first time the party had received less than 60 
per cent (Desai and Vahed, 2017:41). Furthermore, it was the first time the ANC had lost control 
over the major economic hubs, Pretoria and Johannesburg, as well as the historically ANC-loyal 
Nelson Mandela Bay (Ibid). By Greene’s (2010a:23, 50-51) conceptualization South Africa under 
the ANC went from a proto-dominant party system to a SPD system after 2009 as it surpassed the 
four election threshold. As such, ANC was no longer in the “liberation legacy stage”.  
 
Figure 1 ANC Election Results 
The aim of the following sections is two-fold. The main objective is to elaborate upon the 
usefulness and applicability of a number of key concepts, as well as how these components 
interact, shaping the theory as a whole. This will be done by discussing these variables within a 
framework of the ANC. The reader will be guided through the history of the ANC from being a 
liberation movement to present day ANC. Historic events and developments will be linked to each 
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president from Mandela to Zuma. The second aim of the chapter is to provide the fundamental 
knowledge of the party which will be of importance throughout the thesis.   
3.3.2 The Historical Legacy of the ANC’s ‘Broad Church’ 
The struggle for democracy was fought by numerous anti-apartheid organisations all of which 
represented different ideas about what a post-apartheid South Africa should look like (Johnson, 
2003: 322). However, ANC’s racially inclusive orientation and long institutional history created a 
pool of adaptive capabilities that enabled it to contain internal factional conflict and out-compete 
its rivals (Reddy, 2014: 103). Compared to other liberation groups the ANC followed a more 
inclusive ideology and proved more open to negotiations with the apartheid regime (Ibid). The 
ANC proved institutionally stronger than rival organisations, which were either unable to adapt or 
remained internally coherent (Butler, 2012:20). Moreover, one of ANC’s advantages has been its 
capability for self-investigation and reflectiveness (Ibid).  
The ANC, influenced by the SACP’s two-stage revolution theory, was open to abandoning some 
of its more radical socialist demands and negotiate the terms of a liberal democracy, while other 
liberation movements would not (Hart, 2007:88). For example, the Pan Africanist Congress of 
Azania (PAC), formed by a group of former ANC-Africanists in 1959, stated that it would only be 
willing to negotiate with the apartheid regime if land redistribution was made a priority (Bavusile 
Maaba, 2001:421, 430). The PAC saw the ANC as too moderate in its approach to the struggle 
and in terms of economic and racial policy (Ibid). The ANC on the other hand, started the 
negotiations with the former regime with more moderate demands, in which the question of land 
was left untouched (Suttner, 2006:293).  
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3.3.3 Defining Policy Preferences in a Changing Society   
The struggle against apartheid provided common cause among liberation groups, which allowed 
for people with different ideological, inter-generational and organisational stances to unite to fight 
a common enemy (Suttner, 2003:177). The ANC’s membership figures grew rapidly: less than a 
year after its unbanning in 1990, half a million people joined. Once elected to power, one of its 
main tasks was to appeal to new constituencies, while simultaneously retaining its support base 
(Gumede, 2007:xi). The move from a liberation movement to a mass movement, which occurred 
with the unbanning of the party, created a situation where the already contested ‘core values’ of 
the party became increasingly disputed. Another challenge the ANC faced was to modernise 
apartheid South Africa’s isolated economy (Ibid).  
For Greene, policy appeals contribute to a dominant party’s longevity and he argues that a 
dominant party will pursue policies preferred by the median voter (2007a:46). However, the 
‘median voter’ model has been critiqued, as it is not entirely clear who the ‘median voter’ is in 
many circumstances (Branko, 2010:5). Black (1948:12) argues that it is only possible to locate a 
‘median voter’ within a framework of one policy. However, as governments have a manifold of 
policies, in addition to there being many variables which affect one’s policy preferences: 
individuals’ preferences seldom overlap (Congleton, 2002:1). This led Roger D. Congleton 
(2002:5-6) to state that the ‘median voter’ does not exist.  
Furthermore, Congleton (2002:5-6) asserts the properties of ‘median’ implies that public policies 
remain constant over time, even when citizens experience drastic changes in their personal and 
external environments. Meaning that increases in the dispersion of voter preferences, in which 
voters move further to the fringes of the political spectrum, will have little, if any effect on policy 
unless increased dispersion also affects the median of the distribution of voter ideal points (Ibid). 
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As such, the policy preferences of the median voter tend to remain more stable, than if an average 
was used as a measurement (Congleton, 2002:5-6). This is problematic in societies undergoing 
significant social-economic alterations (Ibid). Hence, the ‘median voter’s’ preferences within a 
South African context is almost impossible to identify correctly, and even more so as the country 
has undergone significant changes over the last decades. 
Furthermore, the idea of a median voter might prove especially problematic in a South African 
setting due to a number of reasons. The highly racialized legacy of Apartheid with segregation of 
the races might be one of them. The ANC won the election in 1994 with the promise to radically 
transform society both in terms of race and class. For this reason, race policy and economic 
redistribution was an issue of contention. The legacy of systematic racial categorization and 
discrimination under the apartheid regime caused racialized income inequality and opportunities 
(Seekings, 2008:1). Race remains an important social concept in South African society and 
politics. At the transition the minority white South African population remained hugely advantaged 
compared to black population and race continues to be a relevant social category towards creating 
an economic environment that is representative of the population (Southall, 2004:2). Secondly, 
both between and within these racial groups there are large differences in terms of class effects 
interests (Ibid). Over the last decades, class interests have arguably become more at odds with each 
other, due to rapid changes in class structures (Ibid). As such, while we can argue that the average 
South African citizen is a within the category of those who were historically disadvantaged, 
defining the ‘median citizen’ of South Africa in terms of policy is challenging.  
Moreover, Greene (2010a:50-51) denotes less attention to policies for sustaining dominance than 
resources. In his theory, the dominant party can move quite far from the median voter without 
losing support. As such, he argues that resources in combination with “acceptable” policy appeals 
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sustain resources. As with the median voter theory, this creates challenges in terms of defining 
what is considered “acceptable” due to the subjective nature of the term. Additionally, his 
statements about liberation legacies as a cause for dominance complicates things further (Ibid). 
These considerations, both separately and combined, makes it difficult to make any clear 
statements about the relationship between policies and electoral dominance. As such, the theory is 
lacking in testability on the effects of policy appeals on sustained dominance.   
Although, we cannot make any precise judgment on this relationship, a discussion around whether 
the policy assumptions of the theory seem reasonable. As stated earlier, I find the median voter 
theory problematic to employ, and therefore propose that it is more meaningful to look at whether 
the ANC has been successful in obtaining a catch-all character. This term is however not ideal as 
it has also come under criticism for its ambiguity (Krouwel, 2003:27). Nonetheless, I find it more 
acceptable as it does not require an identification of one type of citizen. The basic characteristics 
of the catch-all party is a party spreads across many different sections of society to attract the 
maximum number of votes (Krouwel, 2003:27). As stated earlier, four of the main challenges 
facing the ANC was how to appeal to new constituencies, promote economic growth, transform 
society, and retain support from its original constituencies (Gumede, 2007:xi). As such, diverse 
policies had to be implemented to appeal to many different voters. This required a delicate 
balancing act between welfareism, neo-liberal policies, and socialist rhetoric.   
3.3.4 ANC’s Policy Shifts Following the Transition 
This section will provide an outline of ANC’s policy stance as a party in government; this 
information will be used as backdrop for the subsequent analytical section. The main shift in 
economic policy following the transition was from the more socialist agenda of the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) towards a neo-liberal approach under Mandela, which 
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continued under Mbeki (Binns and Robinson, 2002:26). In 1997, Mbeki ratified Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, without much consultation. The GEAR policy 
was to promote economic growth, defined by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and put social 
welfare policies in the backseat, albeit not entirely ignored (Ibid). Gumede (2007:54, 107) states 
that Mbeki believed that the only way forward was to secure stable economic fundamentals 
quickly. Mandela backed Mbeki in his State of the Nation address some months later, proclaiming 
that market-friendly policies were the only route to sustainable development (Ibid).  
Mbeki’s foremost contribution as the president was his management of the economy in which the 
country experienced an average growth rate of 4-5 per cent per annum, and his policies contributed 
to a development of a rapidly expanding black middle class (Renwick, 2018:12). One central part 
of the GEAR strategy was the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy, which aided a 
relocation of wealth to the expanding black middle class, and particularly the political elements 
within it. Through the use of equity schemes the country saw the rise of a new professional class 
(Ibid). For Gumede (2008:265), the Mbeki-driven modernization reforms expanded the party’s 
support base to include the black and white middle class and groups that had not previously 
supported the ANC. While the ANC government has embraced neo-liberalism, it has also 
implemented policies directed towards those most unfortunate in society. South Africa has an 
extensive welfare state, compared to other middle-income countries, with considerable social 
grants and provision (Sevenhuijsen, Bozalek, et al, 2003:302). For instance, Seekings and Moore’s 
research (2014:427) states that almost one-third of all adults and minors receive a social grant each 
month. As such, Butler maintains that in the course of democratisation, the ANC’s catch-all 
character has meant that it is able to provide fertile ground for foreign investment, but also 
concentrate on standard issues such as health and education (2005:729, 779).  
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The neo-liberal policies under Mbeki disgruntled those who had hoped for more radical changes 
(Gumede, 2007:54, 107). Mbeki’s strategy for handling the ‘most radical’ forces of the ANC 
alliance was to listen attentively without making assurances, while at the same time constructing 
a perception of agreement (Ibid). Over time, the once fairly contained tensions within the ANC 
under Mandela, become more evident under Mbeki and Zuma (Reddy, 2014:105). Zuma had been 
able to rally a peculiar left-populist coalition of dissatisfied grassroots activists, unemployed youth, 
socialists, trade unionists, veteran guerrilla fighters, women’s lobbies, evangelicals, and black 
business tycoons (Gumede: 2007:265). According to Beresford (2009:406), the “leftist” factions 
in the ANC and its alliance partners perceived Zuma as a man who was more in touch with the 
lives of the ‘everyday workers’ and someone who was more willing to listen to their grievances 
than Mbeki (Ibid).  
Hence, economic policy within the ANC took another turn. In November of 2010, the Zuma-led 
administration announced a new strategy: the ‘New Growth Path’ (NGP) (Beresford, 2009:406). 
Increased employment, rather than only economic growth, was the main aim of the policy, as 
illustrated by its goal of creating 5 million new jobs by 2020 (Hurt, 2017: 298). De Jager 
(2009:285) believes that the Polokwane conference, in which Mbeki was forced to step down as 
the president of the ANC, signified a return to a more socialist agenda, which had been abandoned 
with GEAR. However, little progress was made towards achieving this goal, as unemployment 
rates increased under Zuma’s presidency (Kantor, 2017:105-106). While many had hoped that 
Zuma would usher new life into the party and reconnect the party to the people, implementation 
and evidence is lacking (Booysen, 2011:8). As such, Southall (2014:53) maintains that the ANC 
has moved away from its socialist goal consistently. Likewise, Renwick (2018:69) states it was 
very clear under Mbeki who was in control of the economic policies, while Zuma never showed 
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much interest in policy. These views articulate that the ANC’s initial stance regarding the party’s 
role as the ‘people’s party’ has pursued growth-oriented rather than people-oriented development 
strategies.  
3.4 Constraints, Changing Environment and Party Fragmentation 
As seen in the previous section, the ANC has consistently moved away from its socialist mandate 
post 1994. Even though, it is arguable that both Mandela and Mbeki were never ideologically 
located on the left and more aligned with a neo-liberal school of thought, this section will explore 
potential internal and external forces that affect policy. This move in which ideology seemingly 
plays a lesser role is reflected in David White’s (2011:660) work. He argues that the dominant 
party must change the tactics used prior to its first victory, and through a path of reinvention to 
ensure the widest possible constituency (Ibid). A common technique is thus to move away from a 
rigid ideological position, to become a catch-all party reflecting the preferences from many sectors 
of society (White, 2011:660). White’s work on SPD in Russia draws on many of the same 
arguments as Greene (2007a, 2010a): he argues that ideological flexibility, access to state 
resources, and the ability to mobilize key socio-economic groups sustains United Russia’s 
dominance (Ibid, 655). Furthermore, like Greene, he reasons that the advantageous position over 
opposition parties has a number of consequences such as uncompetitive policy appeals (Greene, 
2007a:46, White, 2011:550). A more subtle resemblance between the two is that they share the 
underlying assumption that long-term dominant parties are unrestricted (Ibid). 
Although, dominant parties might be relatively advantaged over the opposition, I argue that an 
overemphasis on these advantages might overshadow how the dominant party is restricted, and 
consequently the theory as a whole. Certainly, Greene (2007a:39) would argue that the ANC was 
more restricted in its initial years as a ruling party, as it classified as a governing party in a fully 
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competitive democracy. Its resource advantage over the opposition would not be as extensive. 
Nonetheless, he states that it would have an upper hand in terms of having access to perquisites of 
office and added fundraising capacity (Ibid). While the initial advantages are relatively small, he 
reasons they often ensure re-election. Moreover, he reasons that former liberation movement 
parties in government are initially advantaged by their historical importance (2010a:50). Lastly, as 
dominance is further cemented, a politically controlled bureaucracy and extensive resources at 
hand, within a context where the party as a whole benefits from diversion of public funds, 
opposition parties are unable to compete (Greene, 2007a:39).   
Certainly, the ANC was restricted in a magnitude of ways after the transition. It is however, 
challenging to predict at what pace this was starting to diminish, as argued by Greene. Yet, it is 
arguable that limited political control in early ANC rule is not unrelated to ANC of today. These 
early challenges are also necessary to mention for the reader for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the party in the subsequent chapters.   
When the ANC won office, it did not automatically translate into hegemonic political power for a 
number of reasons explained below. Firstly, one argument applicable both early ANC rule, but 
throughout ANC rule as well is presented by Suttner. He argues that the ruling party faces a 
multiplicity of interests from different economic actors, both domestic and international, which 
restricts what the party is able to accomplish (2006:293). Macro-economic policies are not 
independent from external pressure from big businesses and can affect the extent of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), which is necessary to grow South Africa’s economy (Ibid). In essence, capital 
retains massive power, not due to the voting power of capitalists, but rather due to their economic 
significance (Seekings and Nattrass, 2002:4). In the age of globalisation, capital is more mobile 
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and can easily be relocated to a different country. Hence, before polices are decided upon, national 
governments must take into consideration the interests of capital (Ibid).  
For instance, the political influence of white capital remained post-1994 (Southall, 2008:8). 
Mandela had built close friendships with two of the most powerful white business elites, Harry 
Oppenheimer and Anton Rupert (Renwick, 2018:7). The Oppenheimer family, the former owners 
of the De Beers diamond company and the mining company Anglo American, even provided 
Mandela with economic advisors (Onishi and Gebrekidan, 2018). Having once endorsed the 
nationalisation of the economy, the ANC shifted towards more pro-business policies. According 
to Renwick (2018:7) Mandela redirected most of the responsibility for economic policies to his 
deputy, Thabo Mbeki.  
Secondly, diverse interest are also located within the dominant party. While prior to becoming a 
governing party, the ANC had endorsed a socialist approach, as articulated in the Freedom Charter 
and The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Renwick, 2018:5). However, the 
ANC’s policy stance both prior to and following 1994 was never clear-cut and has always been 
contested. Renwick (2018:5) argues that while Mandela obtained for a short period of time 
membership of the SACP by the virtue of his leadership in the military wing of the ANC, 
uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), his views were not aligned with communism. Mandela’s main guiding 
principle was ‘one person, one vote’ (Ibid). This leads to one particular issue within the Resource 
Theory that will be of importance throughout this thesis: defining the dominant party and its 
interests.  
Greene (2010a:25-26) sees the dominant party as one unified actor, based on his assumption that 
benefits are party-specific rather than individual-specific within a SPD context. This emphasis on 
the dominant party as unified does not account for the possibility of intra-party competition. 
53 
 
Greene addresses intra-party competition in the former-dominant parties in a collaboration with 
Hector Ibarra-Rueda (2014:29). However, this work only recognises intra-party competition in 
oppositional parties thus speaks about it indirectly. The two authors claim that former-dominant 
parties experience factionalism and intra-party conflict because of the loss of the concentrated 
power vested in the chief executive (Ibid). This indicates a view the chief executive is an important 
for maintaining order, albeit not synonyms with the party in itself, due to Greene’s assumption of 
the party being one unit.  
The statement that the party is one unified actor ignore a number of potential inferences on policy 
decisions and how policies are communicated. While factionalism has always been a part of the 
ANC, it has arguably not vanished after the party obtained dominance status in 2009. While the 
ANC has been plagued with factionalism since the 1930s, at the very least, and Butler (2012:6) 
believes that the ANC’s current fissures represent more than a continuation, or resurgence, of 
enduring and familiar historical divisions. Reddy states that intra-party tensions were fairly well 
constrained under Mandela, but the party has undergone significant changes in the past two 
decades, which has revealed the high level of intra-party factionalisation (Reddy, 2014:105). These 
changes will be elaborated upon below.  
In terms of policy, the ANC is often vague on its stance and how to get there. Suttner (2006:291, 
292) argues that to deal with factionalism, consensus-building is necessary feature of dominant 
parties as well as maintaining room for debates (Suttner, 2006:291-292). Consensus is, however, 
not synonymous with agreement, which means the party expresses what is common between the 
different actors and disagreements are left out of the consensus (Ibid). This view is confirmed by 
Lodge (2004:19), stating that Intra-party factionalisation manifests itself through ambiguous 
policy stances. Furthermore, it also manifests itself through the use of liberation discourses. 
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The ANC often relies on liberation discourses for justifying its rule, as the ANC proclaims it is the 
guardian of a radical transformation project (Friedman, 1999:110). The ANC regularly endorses 
the self-image of a movement devoted to revolutionary struggle to remake society, as opposed to 
a ‘conventional’ political party (Beresford et. Al, 2018:1234). ANC policy documents and official 
discourse imply that the struggle did not end with the fall of the apartheid regime and it is the duty 
of the ANC to safeguard the country against any forces that try to hamper the national 
transformation project (Ibid). The 1969 document “Strategy and Tactics of the ANC” contains that 
the ANC’s mandate was “earned in the crucible of struggle and the battles for social 
transformation”, as well as “the ANC currently remains the only primary force capable of driving 
the project of social transformation” (ANC, 1969). More recent ANC literature confirms that it 
continues to position itself as the only legitimate guardian of radical social transformation of the 
‘national project’ (Schrire, 2001:138). In 2012, the ANC published a document titled “the second 
transition”, which stated that it would take 50 to 100 years to reach a new era of industrialisation 
and development, and that it was necessary for the ANC to oversee the process (ANC, 2012:37). 
Another example is demonstrated by former President Zuma’s statement that the party is destined 
to govern ‘until Jesus returns’, implying that the party is mandated by God (Beresford et al., 
2018:1234).  
While these discourses have their function in claiming legitimacy, they also mirrors conflict within 
the party. For Butler (2012:6) one can understand both the unity and conflict in the ANC by looking 
at how it communicates its own history. On the one hand, the ANC has been able to sustain and 
proclaim a fairly coherent and consensual grand narrative; competing narratives between factions 
on who is entitled to rule based on liberation credentials have become more apparent over the years 
(Ibid). While these dialogues may provide vital ideological functions, they are vague on the details 
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of the party’s actual policy stance and its preferred method of achieving its goals (Lodge, 
2004:1,19). 
Post-apartheid South Africa experienced a renewed process of class formation, which affected the 
internal unity of the ANC (Ibid). Much of the current ANC leadership is involved in the 
accumulation of wealth on an unprecedented scale and the interests of this new ‘empowered’ 
diverges sharply from those of ordinary members. At the same time, the black middle class has 
expanded through access to education, business opportunity and public sector employment (Butler, 
2012:6). These classes, which are making their way to economically well-off positions, co-exist 
uncomfortably with a growing mass membership still experiencing economic marginalisation 
(Butler, 2012:6).  
As the modern day ANC has to appeal to a broader spectrum of interests, ANC’s history as a 
liberation movement guides its conceptualisation of its role as a political party. This has, and still 
does to some degree benefit the party in a number ways as argued by Greene. Firstly, the 
characterisation of the party as a liberation movement, and not merely a political party, allows the 
ANC to embrace much broader constituencies than social-cleavage-based political parties, such as 
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (Lodge, 2004:19). It also grants the ability to maintain close ties 
with different kinds of civil society structures (Ibid). For example, Benìt-Gbaffou (2012:12) states 
that as a mass party the ANC continues to have a heavy presence in civil society in urban low-
income neighbourhoods. The party focuses on maintaining its mass support amongst its popular 
constituencies, and this is where local ANC branches play a significant role. These party branches 
create a space where people can express their local concerns. As such, the party’s historical 
significance allows for structures where it can be informed on local matters, as well the opportunity 
to diffuse tension when necessary by attending to these matters (Ibid). ANC’s longstanding 
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connection with the people is a fundamental source of its strength and identity (Yung, 2014:140). 
The capability of critical introspective analysis, has to some degree remained with the ANC, argues 
Yung. Furthermore, in a context of increased social protest it must constantly work out how to re-
connect with ‘the people’ (Ibid).  
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter presented Greene’s assumptions regarding the role of policy appeals and the liberation 
legacy in maintaining party dominance. The chapter began with an overview of the level of ANC 
electoral dominance, which remained fairly stable in the first decade of democracy but decreased 
to an all-time low under President Zuma.  
In terms of explaining the relation between policy and electoral dominance, Greene argued that 
dominant parties make policy appeals that reflect the median voter’s preferences in order to 
maximise their vote share. This is based upon the median voter theory within a rational choice 
framework. While the theory is firmly based in theory, several scholars have argued that it lacks 
testability. Firstly, it is unclear who represents the median voter is as there are many social markers 
that can influence individuals’ policy preferences on various policy issues. Secondly, the 
properties of ‘median’ as a measure suggests that these preferences remain relatively constant over 
time, even when society changes at a rapid rate. The diversity of South African society also poses 
significant challenges in determining who is the median voter. In addition, South African society 
has changed drastically over the last few decades in terms of class formation, thus resulting in 
interests that are more diverse.  
While the term catch-all party has also been critiqued for its ambiguity, I argue that this term is 
more suitable than defining a median voter. However, these subjective terms are not optimal for 
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making conclusive statements about how policies interact with electoral dominance. The catch-all 
party concept denotes whether the ANC has been effective in attracting voters across many sectors 
of society.  
There were four main challenges in early ANC rule, namely how to appeal to those who had not 
previously supported the ANC, how to promote economic growth, transform society, and maintain 
the support from its old constituencies. In terms of economic policy, the ANC shifted from the 
socialist agenda of the RDP towards a neo-liberal approach, which was continued under Mbeki. 
Under his  leadership the economy saw an average growth rate of 4-5 per cent per year, and the 
rise of a new black professional class was developing at a rapid pace. Although the ANC had 
embraced a neo-liberal approach, welfare policies aimed at helping the most disadvantaged in 
society were also being implemented. As such, it is arguable that the ANC was fairly successful 
in adopting a catch-all character during its early period in power, as the party adopted pro-business 
policies, but also focused on common issues such as health and education. However, the neo-
liberal policies of Mbeki were not well received by the more left-wing factions within the ANC 
and he was replaced by former president Zuma. Zuma proved himself to only be socialist in 
rhetoric, and not in practice. In essence, the ‘party of the people’ pursued growth-orientated rather 
than people-orientated development strategies. It obtained its best election results in 2004 (69.69 
per cent) under the neo-liberal Mbeki, and its lowest in 2014 (62.15 per cent) under the socialist-
rhetoric Zuma.  
Moreover, while the Resource Theory states that policy appeals play a role in sustaining electoral 
dominance, they are given less importance than resources. Greene states that resources in 
combination with “acceptable” policy appeals sustain dominance. As such, he believes that the 
dominant party has significant space to manoeuvre without losing support. He further argues that 
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policy appeals are important for legitimacy amongst the population and for lowering the cost of 
patronage. As with his use of the median, Greene’s theory also leaves us with the question of what 
are considered “acceptable” policies. However, this is further complicated by his stance on 
liberation legacies. While he recognises the role of a liberation legacy as a cause of dominance, he 
contends that this variable will eventually have less of an effect on allegiance. He states that the 
effects of liberation credentials on dominance will differ between each country, but that the 
absolute cut-off point is when the dominant party has reached the four-election or 20-year 
threshold. The theory’s vagueness regarding the role of policy appeals further hampers testability.  
Some other concerns arise with his overemphasis on the sovereignty of the dominant party. His 
theory presents a dichotomy, in which opposition parties are restricted in terms of policies 
available to them while the dominant party can choose freely. On the other hand, this only applies 
to dominant parties that have been in power for an extended period of time. Greene recognises that 
the ANC was restricted during its early period of governance, but it still enjoyed an advantage over 
the opposition through the perquisites of office. Without taking into consideration the size and 
level of control of the public sector, which is a necessary precondition for access to resources, we 
cannot know at what stage of ANC rule the party was unrestricted in terms of policy appeals.  
The last section has highlighted a number of potential theoretical weaknesses beyond the issue of 
the usage of vague concepts. First, I argued that the sovereignty of the dominant party is 
exaggerated, as the theory focuses on the position of the dominant party in relation to the 
opposition. However, in the age of globalisation, capital has immense power. Even if wealthy 
domestic and international companies abstain from funding the opposition, capital can easily be 
relocated to other countries. Therefore, the dominant party is not entirely free to choose whatever 
policy it likes without the economy being affected. Secondly, Greene regards the dominant party 
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as one unified actor. Consequently, he dismisses factionalisation within the party, which can affect 
which policies are implemented, how they are communicated, and the complexities of liberation 
legacy discourses.  
The following chapter will take Greene’s argument one-step further by looking at patronage 
employment in the public sector and the role of labour unions in sustaining dominance. The main 
focus will be on the size and level of the politicisation of the public sector, which is a pre-condition 
for access to state resources.   
 
 
 
60 
 
 
Chapter 4: Patronage Employment and Single Party 
Dominance  
4.1 Introduction  
“Party government isn’t organized for efficiency, not to serve the people. It is organized to provide 
jobs for the boys.” Syracuse Herland (1913:8)  
The previous chapter examined Greene’s (2007a:46) predictions around policy appeals as a 
strategy to maintain dominance by the dominant party. The main findings were that the theory was 
severely disadvantaged in terms of testability due to the use of  subjective or imprecise measures. 
This chapter focuses on another aspect of Greene’s resource Theory - the significance of public 
sector employment and unions for sustaining dominance (2007b:20; 2010a:25-26).  
Issues related to patronage employment and resources are interrelated. To operationalise control 
of resources in the next chapter I use state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) as a proxy. Consequently, 
some topics which could have been covered within the framework of patronage employment will 
intentionally be left to the next chapter. To compensate for this limitation, the final chapter will 
piece all the components together.    
The first section of this chapter sets out a theoretical framework of patronage networks, comprised 
of Greene’s assumptions, as well as considerations from other scholars. Through an analysis of 
public sector employment under ANC I investigate the correlation between increased public sector 
employment and electoral dominance. The third section of this chapter will discuss potential 
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theoretical weaknesses and their consequences for our findings. Lastly, the role of unions for 
dominance will be examined.  
4.2 Political Patronage  
4.2.1 Defining Patronage Contracts 
Conceptually, patronage systems in public services entails contracts between superiors and 
multiple subordinates, where there is expected reciprocity between public sector employees in 
return for forms of loyalty (Grindle, 2012:27). Often, in addition to performing their regular jobs, 
recipients of patronage jobs are expected to provide political services for the incumbent who 
provided them with the job. Patronage employment thus offers incumbents a powerful tool, which 
takes the form of an unlimited army of ‘political workers’. According to Oliveros (2017:30) there 
is an unwritten understanding that the citizen who receives a government job is expected to fulfil 
his/her part of the agreement upon being employed.  
Grindle (2012:28) asserts that to understand patronage systems it is useful to compare them to their 
antithesis, namely a career civil service system. Within a career civil service system, the majority 
of non-elected public sector positions are selected through a process of credentialing based on 
education, examination, or some other test of merit. Career advancements are based on a 
regularised demonstration of merit to counter malfeasance in office. In these systems, the 
employee executes his/her obligations to the state or the service, not to the patron, and the rules of 
the game are kept formal and objective through regulations and procedures. In a patronage system, 
on the other hand, power is located at the top and flows downward, while the loyalty flows upward. 
In addition, the loyalty is personal and defined from above. In sum, the contract involves a mutual 
commitment to the goals of the patron, be it the king, the president, a parliamentary leader, mayor, 
union boss and so on (Ibid). The nature of the contract is such that the law cannot be used to 
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enforce it, although the contract is understood by all parties involved (Grindle, 2012:27-28; 
Oliveros, 2017:30). Oliveros (2017:30) argues that it is conceivable that public employees under 
patronage contracts deliver free and vital political services to their employers. It is contested as to 
why the ‘client’ continues to comply (Oliveros, 2017:30; Robinson and Verdier, 2013:261-267). 
There is debate as to why an employee would carry out particular services after having already 
received the benefits of office and Oliveros suggests that it would not be in the interest of the 
incumbent to hire someone who would not uphold his/her part of the bargain and thus ‘waste’ the 
position (2017:30). 
There are three major theoretical frameworks to explain continued compliance with 
patron/clientelistic relationships. From an instrumentalist viewpoint, Robinson and Verdier 
(2013:62-63) argue that employment in the public bureaucracy are reversible and a patronage job 
may be withdrawn, which in turn secures compliance. The same logic applies to voting behaviour 
in which the incumbent can argue that particular services and benefits will disappear if the party 
loses.  
Another reason is based on reciprocity, which denotes a physiological explanation of indebtedness 
that the clients feel (Oliveros, 2017:30). For Greene and Lawson (2014:62-63) this equates to a 
norm-based clientelism evident in voting behaviour. Voters, they say, uphold their part of the 
‘contract’ due to feelings of indebtedness and gratitude similar to if they had received a gift, favour, 
service or protection (Ibid).  
Greene (2010a:25-26) advances a different rationale to explain adherence to patronage 
employment contracts. He argues that employees do not provide political services solely due to 
feelings of indebtedness, but also because their interests are aligned with the governing party, 
which allows for unrestricted access to the state coffers. This is based on the assumption that 
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benefits within a SPD system benefit all members of the party (Ibid). Oliveros (2017:32) adds to 
this by arguing that the deal becomes self-enforcing, as victories for the patron also benefit the 
client. This does not mean that the fear of punishment or feelings of reciprocity are never present 
in clientelistic contracts, or that they have no purpose. Instead, they are not necessary features of 
these arrangements (Ibid).  
4.2.2 The Power of Controlling Patronage Positions  
In current discourse patronage employment is often regarded as related to corruption and 
incompetence. Hence, it is often overlooked as a flexible means of managing power, which has 
been used both historically to achieve a wide range of goals (Grindle, 2012:41). Patronage systems 
have shown to be resilient, primarily due to their usefulness in securing the objectives of those in 
power. These objectives may range from reinforcing absolutist rule, creating capable nations, 
safeguarding the hegemony of class elites, securing access to private wealth and power, defining 
the prosperity of political parties, and promoting substantial policy changes (Ibid).  
As bureaucrats have access to large amounts of resources, which can be used for political and 
personal gain, appointments based on personal connections are essential so that politicians may 
use these resources for patronage (Muller, 2007:257). Politicians can demand favours more 
easily when positions are based on close connections, and these connections in turn provide the 
politicians with the resources they need (Ibid). Likewise, Kopecky et al (2008:7) contend that 
without the control of state agencies, it cannot give advantages to specific constituencies through 
the allocation of resources nor can it access public resources to advance private interests. 
In Greene’s (2007a:40) theory, dominant parties secure monopolistic access to public resources 
which they may exchange for patronage goods (2007a:40). These patronage goods can range from 
positions in government, access to certain welfare benefits, and campaign handouts, such as food 
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parcels and material goods (Booysen, 2014:24). However, in order for the incumbent to access 
these public funds, the public bureaucracy must be politically controlled (Greene, 2010a:25-26). 
Greene’s argument has a number of overlapping components. Firstly, public sector employment is 
a major source of patronage as it provides the incumbent with large numbers of job opportunities 
to distribute relative to those available to the opposition (Greene, 2007a:40). Greene asserts that 
the ability of the dominant party to hand out patronage jobs secures an increased number of votes 
on election day. The second benefit is the availability of human capital relative to how much the 
opposition can access. Due to the dominant party’s resource advantage it can access paid 
professional party personnel, whereas resource-poor parties have to rely on volunteers as both 
candidates and activists. They have few material benefits at their disposal to offer supporters 
(Greene, 2007a:304).  
Furthermore, large amounts of non-convertible administrative state resources are made available 
to the dominant party by public employees. Some examples of such resources are office supplies, 
vehicles, mobile phones, and postage (Greene, 2007a:40). For instance, in the case of Russia, there 
was a strategy change in 2003 aimed at increasing political control over the governors (Reuter and 
Remington: 2008:502). This was done after a realization that the party was in need of the 
governors’ substantial administrative resources prior to the 2003 elections (Ibid). The resources 
may provide the incumbent with an advantage for informing, persuading, and mobilising public 
support. Public sector employees may also, themselves, be used to cajole party support (Greene, 
2007a: 40). 
4.3 Public Sector Employment in South Africa 
A core tenet of Greene’s (2007a:40) theory is that public sector employment provides a key source 
of patronage. Control over public sector employment provides the dominant party with jobs to 
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distribute, which according to Greene, generates increased votes on election day. Moreover, as 
will be the theme in the subsequent chapter is the necessity of large politically controlled 
bureaucracy for the dominant party to access resources (Ibid). It should however be stated that 
large public sectors can also be found in fully competitive democracies. As such, Greene does not 
state that a large public sector creates SPD systems, rather it is a necessity for dominance 
(2007a:40). As such, the degree of political control plays a significant role. Therefore, we should 
expect a positive relationship where a dominant party holds political control over a larger public 
service and an increased shares of votes for that party. Before exploring the degree of politicisation 
of South Africa’s public bureaucracy, developments in size will be deliberated upon.  
According to research by Bhorat and his colleagues the public sector has seen the greatest 
expansion of job creation since 2004 (2016:18). In 2001, the public sector encompassed 17 per 
cent of all employment and in 2016 accounted for had 22.5 per cent of employment. In 2008, 2.16 
million people were employed by the state, which increased to 2.69 million in 2014, demonstrating 
an upsurge of more than half a million jobs over a six-year period (Ibid). The public sector 
encompasses employment in government at the national, provincial and local levels, as well as in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The majority of employment is found within government, as 
opposed to employment in SOEs: 88 per cent of public sector employment is found within the first 
category (Bhorat et. al, 2016:18). Comparatively, Franks stated as of 2014 South Africa had three 
times more public sector employees than either Brazil or Russia, which are two of South Africa’s 
BRICS partners; and slightly smaller than the United Kingdom and the United States (2014:55). 
However, the ANC appeared to reach its peak in terms of electoral dominance in 2004, after which 
there was a decline. It is however important to note that the public sector also encompasses non-
ANC staff. Early in ANC tenure, the public sector still encompassed civil servants from the old 
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regime (Suttner, 2008:279). On the other hand, this also applies later in ANC rule, albeit for a 
different reason. Post the 2006 municipal elections the ANC was not in control of four of South 
Africa’s eight metropolitan areas- Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Johannesburg 
(Schreiber, 2018:34). As such, the public service encompasses ANC and non-ANC public 
servants. Nonetheless, the ANC still had electoral stronghold, indicating that the expansion in size 
of the public sector has not translated into increased votes for the ANC. An overview of public 
sector expansion can be seen in the tables below.  
 
Figure 2: Public sector employment- indices 
(Data collected from the South African Reserve Bank) 
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Figure 3: Public sector employment (%ch y/y) 
(Data collected from the South African Reserve Bank) 
Naidoo (2018:5) argues that developments within South Africa’s government administration can 
be divided into three sub-periods according to the different presidencies: the Mandela era, the 
Mbeki era, and lastly the Zuma era, which had varying effects on the relationship between the 
ANC and the public bureaucracy.  
Chipkin and Swilling (2018:14) state that the ANC inherited an uncoordinated and broken 
administrative system from the Nationalist Party (NP). When the ANC gained political power, 
there were fourteen separate and parallel administrations, each with its own government and 
government departments in the Bantustans, in addition to the racialised administrations of the 
tricameral system at the national level (Ibid). This resulted in a lack of political control, which was 
seen as a major obstacle to transformation. However, the ANC believed, and rightfully so, that 
resistance to implementation of the RDP by apartheid-era public servants was likely, therefore 
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maximising political control over government administrations was regarded as essential. 
Moreover, transformation of the apartheid institutions extended from provincial and local 
administrations, to the judiciary, parliament and the executive, if the ANC were to deliver its 
promise of an equal deracialised society (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:14).  
Naidoo’s research (2018:2-4) shows that there was public sector growth, but also a fluctuating 
number of departments and entities under Mandela until, 1999/2000, which was partly a result of 
the testing of different institutional arrangements. The highest number of government departments 
and entities reached was thirty, and at the end of Mandela’s term the number was just under thirty. 
Overall, Naidoo concludes that there was an incremental expansion of the national machinery 
when the need to undo apartheid structures was considered (2018:13). On the other hand, electoral 
dominance increased significantly from the 1994 elections to the 1999 elections, showing an 
increase from 62.65 per cent to 66.33 per cent. In fact, the 1999 elections were the ANC’s second 
biggest electoral victory, following the 2004 elections. As the ANC was still trying to cement 
political control over the public bureaucracy, there are few indications that the size of the public 
bureaucracy caused this increase (Ibid). Political control over the public bureaucracy was limited 
under Mandela, yet the ANC received a similar vote share in 1994 and 2014. These figures suggest 
that the increasing size of the public bureaucracy did not influence electoral dominance 
significantly.  
During the ‘second era’, under Mbeki’s presidency, this size remained relatively unchanged with 
only moderate alterations to ministerial departments. For Naidoo (2018:16) this represented a 
consolidation of the changes made under Mandela.  
In Greene’s (2010a:25-26) Resource Theory, both the size of the public sector and political control 
over the state bureaucracy are essential for the maintenance of electoral dominance. Control over 
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the bureaucracy feeds client-patron relationships through a commonality of goals, which allows 
for a diversion of resources. As stated previously, party connection and loyalty determine 
employment opportunities (Ibid). As such, related to the size of the public bureaucracy is the extent 
to which the bureaucracy is politicised. Several scholars have argued that there was an increased 
level of public sector politicisation from the Mandela to the Mbeki eras. Peters and Pierre 
expressed concern about this increased politicisation of public sector employment, arguing that 
positions previously shielded from political interference had succumbed to political pressure and 
appointments (2004:288). A 2007 study centred on the political involvement of bureaucracies in 
twelve countries by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
addressed the politicisation of areas related to hiring, firing, promotion, transfer and performance 
assessment of public servants from 2000 to 2006. The research showed high political involvement 
in the South African bureaucracy, with only Italy and the United States being slightly more 
politicised (Matheson at al, 2007:5). As these two countries are not SPD systems, albeit Italy is a 
former SPD system which ended in 1992, stressed the fact that high levels of public sector 
politicisation is not just a characteristic of SPD systems.  
The Zuma era ushered in the most changes to the South African public sector (Naidoo, 2018:24). 
When Zuma assumed the Presidency in 2009, the number of government departments and entities 
spiked. New departments were created, and existing ones split (Ibid). Despite the increase in under 
Zuma, the ANC’s vote share dropped. In the 2009 elections, the ANC’s share of votes had dropped 
by 3.79 per cent by the 2014 elections, this number had fallen another 3.75 per cent. The 2014 
elections marked the lowest number of votes ever received  by the ANC and is also the year with 
the highest levels of politicisation of the public sector recorded by the OECD. The overall picture 
of the recent developments is one of high political involvement in staff appointments, but 
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especially in senior public service staff, with significant control over promotion, transfer and 
performance (Cameron: 2010:696). This is contrary to ANC’s early years of governance, as the 
government in its early years of governance did not necessarily hire card-carrying members of the 
ANC, but individuals with a shared vision of radical transformation (Ibid).  
In the second wave of appointments, on the other hand, the ANC targeted card-carrying cadres for 
senior positions in the bureaucracy and was more overtly political. Cameron (2010:696) adds that 
in some cases ministers appoint staff at much lower levels as well. Beresford (2015:7) argues that 
there is a significant spoils system in South African politics, with a key feature being the 
distribution of patronage employment. He maintains that there are many examples of political 
appointments at all levels of public office that have been distributed on the basis of political loyalty 
rather than competence, be it provincial premiers, mayors or municipal managers, as well as 
examples of firing non-compliant individuals (Ibid).  
The overall trends show an intensification of political control over the public sector in South Africa 
(Desai and Vahed, 2017:30). The following sections elaborate upon the role of unions for 
dominance. Both themes, public sector employment and labour unions are closely related to the 
misuse of state resources. However, for the sake of not repeating argument and limited scope of 
this thesis, the intersection between patronage employment and resources, and potential effects 
thereof will be extensively elaborated upon in the following chapter.  
4.4 Unions and Sustaining Party Dominance 
One related topic to public sector employment in Greene’s theory (2010b:259) is the role of unions 
in sustaining party dominance, as he argued was a factor in sustaining the PRI’s dominance in 
Mexico. Grindle (2012:30) explains this process using the examples from throughout Latin 
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America. She states that it was only Costa Rica, Chile, and Brazil which recruited a noteworthy 
number of public sector employees through a structured career civil service system (Grindle, 
2012:134). While recruitment to the public service is often done through patronage, tenure goes 
through collective bargaining agreements. Hence, while tenure is regulated through collective 
agreements, the way people obtain their employment in the first place indicates a commitment to 
the patron (Ibid).   
In a similar way that public sector employment is leveraged for patronage, Greene argues that a 
relationship with unions also help the dominant party sustain its position (2007a:40). However, 
just as a large public sector does not indicate a patronage system, it should be made clear that 
cooperation between a political party and a labour union is not automatically a sign of a patronage 
system at work, as a manifold of labour parties across the world have close ties to an associated 
labour union (Haugsgjerd Allern et. al, 2010:2). As such, unions provide a number of benefits to 
the dominant party, which are not necessarily illegal, but contributes to electoral dominance, 
Greene argues (2007a:40). Unions provide a platform to publicise the party, by informing, 
persuading and mobilising potential support among citizens. As unions are mandated to negotiate 
with the government for better terms of employment for its members. As the dominant party can 
select from a large pool of activists for positions, dedicated activism can be rewarded thus limiting 
the chances of hiring individuals who are half-hearted about the cause of the patron. Lastly, union 
members provide the incumbent with votes on election day (Ibid).  
4.4.1 Congress of South African Trade Unions  
In South Africa, the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has been 
and still is the most influential workers’ organisation, despite experiencing a decline in 
membership in recent years (Nkomo, 2016:6). Together with the South African Communist Party 
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(SACP), these groups form the Tripartite Alliance, albeit with the ANC at the helm (Southall, 
2003: 61; Habib and Taylor, 2001:219).   
Pillay (2006: 17) asserts that as early as 1994, union leaders were starting to become entangled in 
different neo-corporatist structures with the government and business, and in networks of 
patronage in all spheres of government - local, provincial and national. Nonetheless, Pillay 
(2006:17,164) emphasises that COSATU never yielded to the same extensive subordination to the 
ANC or the SACP as did the PRI in Mexico during the last century. However, over the years 
COSATU has moved towards a narrower, statist orientation, where the demands of the working 
class was mostly articulated through the state (Ibid). However, tensions are often high between the 
two, even to the point that COSATU members resort to mass action at times. Nevertheless, around 
election time COSATU has consistently supported the ANC (Pillay; 2006:167).  
Although the ANC has been unable to retain full political control over the union, COSATU has 
often been at the mercy of the party (Bassett and Clarke, 2008: 791; Habib and Tylor, 2001: 219). 
Nonetheless, Gumede (2007:110) reasons that the presidents of the ANC are not able to do 
whatever they please without support from key figures within COSATU and the SACP. Patronage 
can be an effective mechanism to attain certain aims, as argued by Grindle (2012:280). For 
instance, in the case of passing the GEAR, Mbeki depended on support from key figures within 
the Alliance partners (Gumede, 2007: 100). By using patronage and promises of high office, he 
managed to persuade key COSATU and SACP representatives to come on board. Both Charles 
Nqakula and Mbhazima Shilowa, who initially opposed GEAR, turned into devoted defenders of 
the policy. In turn, Shilowa became Premier of Gauteng, and Nqakula was appointed to Mbeki’s 
cabinet as the Safety and Security Minister (Ibid).  
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However, over the years COSATU has started to take a more critical stance towards ANC 
leadership. In addition, some key COSATU affiliates have left the union. In late 2011, COSATU’s 
General Secretary Zwelinizma Vavi proclaimed that millions of South Africans were no better off 
financially than they had been before 1994 (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:9). Further tensions have 
surfaced since then.  Consequently, in April 2017 some COSATU affiliates abandoned the union 
and created a new body, the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) under the 
leadership of Vavi (Ibid). In addition, the National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa 
(NUMSA), which had been banished from COSATU a few years before for its increasingly critical 
stance towards the COSATU leadership and the ANC, was welcomed into the new union along 
with its large membership base (Ibid).   
 
4.4.2 Benefits from Union-Party Partnership  
Greene (2007a:40) argues that the dominant party is advantaged through its ability to gain votes 
from union members.  In a 2013 survey, Buhlungu and Ellis examined party support and affiliation 
amongst unionised Eskom workers (2013:301). The results showed steady support for the ANC a 
year prior to all the national elections. In the first two elections following the transition, just under 
90 per cent of COSATU members stated that they were going to vote for the ANC; prior to the 
2004 elections this had increased to 93 per cent; finally there was a small decline to 90 per cent in 
2008. Likewise, Beresford’s (2009:401) findings on party affiliation amongst Eskom workers with 
COSATU membership correspond with Buhlungu and Ellis’s (2013:301), and show that a majority 
of respondents expressed strong support for the ANC, and in times of non-deliverance, problems 
were attributed to failings by individual leaders rather than resulting from the party itself. 
Moreover, a majority believed that ensuring representative leadership within the party would solve 
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most of the problems (Beresford, 2009:401). While this research was done on Eskom workers, 
these trends might reflect sentiment among COSATU-affiliated workers in that particular 
timeframe.  
Historically, COSATU has provided the ANC with election campaign support through political, 
financial and logistical backing (Bassett and Clarke, 2008:791). Just a few examples include 
pamphlets published online in both 1999 and 2016 entitled ‘Why workers should vote the ANC’, 
as well as election posters encouraging people to vote for the ANC in the 2009 elections, and post-
election declarations congratulating the ANC after emerging victorious in the local elections in 
2014 (COSATU; 1999, 2009, 2014, 2016). However, COSATU’s power has decreased 
significantly over the years. The union is experiencing declining membership figures, especially 
since it gained a new competitor, the National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) comprised of 
former COSATU affiliates (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:9). Because of decreasing union 
membership figures, is that the ANC has less to gain from COSATU support than before.    
Even though there is nothing wrong about individuals leaving their work within the union for a 
government position, this has to be on the basis of competence. In a civil service system merit is 
the basis of employment. However, at times, some key union leaders have proven themselves 
accessible only to those who can provide patronage exchanges, in which prestigious positions in 
government have been exchanged for political support (Bassett and Clarke, 2008:79;, Gumede, 
2007:110). With increased voter dissatisfaction over continuous corruption scandals being 
uncovered, patronage exchanges between the patron and labour union leaders might decrease voter 
loyalty (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:9). This will be further elaborated upon in the following 
chapter. 
75 
 
In sum, the utility of COSTAU for the ANC has deteriorated over the years. COSATU’s 
Membership figures have significantly decreased and a competing labour union has been formed 
by former-COSATU affiliates. It is however important to note that many labour unions across the 
globe have been affected by membership losses due to the changing economic environments 
(Behrens et al, 2004:3). Unions seem to be especially weaker in liberal market economies where 
welfare benefits play a lesser role (Ibid). As such, the following section will elaborate on the costs 
of public sector wages and work-related benefits of the South African public sector, as well as the 
role of the unions. The costs of corruption aided through the use of patronage within the party and 
in association with labour union leadership will be discussed in the following chapter.     
4.5 The Cost of the Public Sector and Union Cooperation  
The South African economy deteriorated under the Zuma administration (Karodia et al, 2016:52; 
Kane-Berman, 2016:1). This section analyses the direct costs associated with the public sector and 
unions’ influence over regulations. As will be shown, public sector and labour unions significantly 
overlap due to the over-representativeness of public sector employees in labour union membership 
base, these two themes will be discussed in relation to each other.  
Greene (2007a:40) sees patronage employment as a benefit to the dominant party because it 
provides employment opportunities, provides human capital, and as campaign outreach through 
non-convertible administrative resources of the state. Through these, the dominant party 
outcompetes the opposition in informing, persuading and mobilising support in which the party 
becomes highly effective at broadcasting its message. How the ANC has benefitted from control 
of the public sector is inseparable from resources, and therefore will be left to the following 
chapter. Nonetheless, the share size of the South African public sector makes it in fact the largest 
employment industry (Bhorat et. al, 2016:18; Franks, 2014:55). The second condition necessary 
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for extensive patronage employment is that the public sector is politically controlled. As presented 
earlier, OECD ranked South Africa as one of the countries with the highest level of political 
interference (Matheson et. al, 2007: 5). Furthermore, these trends have arguably become more 
apparent since then (Desai and Vahed, 2017:30). Even though the public sector also encompassed 
non-ANC personnel in areas controlled by the opposition, the ANC still has a stronghold. Thus 
provides credible evidence that the ANC has larger patronage employment opportunities to 
distribute than any of the opposition parties.  
There are two discussions to consider. One is the fact that South Africa is a country where 
unemployment is high, and this has been the case for many years. Beresford (2015:2) highlights 
that the unemployment rate in the country has lingered around 25 per cent and remains amongst 
the highest in the world. In addition, South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world, 
which large part due to its high income inequality. As such, public sector employment is viewed 
as an avenue to rise out of unemployment. Cammack highlights that in areas with high poverty 
rates and limited job opportunities, a position within the state sector is one of the few paths towards 
obtaining an income, and thus is even more rewarding than in wealthier countries (2007:603).  
Kantor (2017:50) also describes the attractiveness of public sector employment in South Africa, 
stating that the public sector provides an appealing mix of low risk (losing one’s job) and return 
(employment). He argues that the public sector has higher wages than the private sector on average, 
as well as greater benefits for employees with similar qualifications. It is also deemed to be more 
protected from competition as there is only one government (Kantor, 2017:198). Lastly, as shown 
by Bosch (2006:22), wages for legislators, senior officials and managers have increased 
significantly more in the public sector than in the private sector since 2001. Looking at the data 
collected from the South African Reserve Bank, Kantor’s argument of greater benefits in the public 
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sector than in the private sector, with all levels of government combined, proves to be valid after 
2015. The chart is calculated in real terms, meaning that inflation has been considered. It shows 
us that public sector wages surpassed those of the private sector after 2015.  
 
Figure 4: Wage developments in public and private sector (%ch y/y) 
(Data collected from the South African Reserve Bank) 
The primary task of unions is to fight for better wages and employment conditions for the 
workforce they represent (Buhlungu and Tshoaedi, 2012:16-17; Kantor, 2017:104). However, for 
Buhlungu and Tshoaedi (2012:16-17), it is important for unions to broaden their membership base 
beyond full-time workers in the formal for the government to take their demands seriously. This 
means that the power and success of a union is contingent on the union’s ability to fulfil its dual 
mandate of uniting a broad spectrum of workers as well as delivering increases in wages and 
improvements in other workplace-related conditions (Buhlungu and Tshoaedi, 2012:16-17). 
Kantor (2017:104-105) disagrees, stating that South African unions have no interest in expanding 
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into new sections of the labour market. In South Africa, he argues, the unions yield extraordinary 
legal powers over policies and regulations, and it is not entirely irrational for the unions to protect 
those already employed in the formal sector and consequently exclude those who are in the 
informal sector or are unemployed. He argues that unions are concerned with financial gains rather 
than increasing the number of jobs (Ibid). The main objective of the unions is to raise the total 
compensation paid to their members, which benefits both the unions themselves and their leaders 
(Ibid). This is done through seeking to extract the highest possible total compensation bill paid by 
employers, which sets the basis for membership fees. In addition, those who receive higher 
incomes may be more willing and able to pay their dues (Kantor, 2017:105, 114). Hence, Kantor 
asserts that unions will prefer to seek higher benefits for the 90 per cent or so of the members who 
retain their jobs, than expanding into new territory, which maximizes profits (Ibid).  
Consequently, the composition of those who are unionised is affected. Kantor (2017:199) explains 
that the portion of private-sector workforce who is unionised has declined, primarily in the service 
sector. The public sector, with superior wages and benefits, by comparison, is almost completely 
unionised (Ibid). For instance, in 2013, the median wage for unionised workers was 129 per cent 
higher than for non-unionised workers (Sethlatswe, 2013:1). As unionised workers are more likely 
to be working in the public sector, there is a high overlapping of votes.  
As such, the cost of each vote to the party may be high (Kantor, 2017:82). Kantor argues that the 
state is outspending on benefits for public sector employees who are protected through their 
union’s powers, at all levels (Ibid). In addition, Seekings et al, (2015:112) adds that many 
COSATU trade unionists have become minister, members of parliament, municipal councillors, 
or government officials. As such, there has been significant pressure for more favourable benefits 
and wages, and much of this has translated into polices, particularly wage regulation. While this 
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can be seen as unproblematic in more equal society with fewer economic constraints, Kantor 
(2017:82) also asserts that this is the main threat to fiscal sustainability in South Africa. Similarly, 
Franks (2014:55) states that the government’s state wage bill accounted for a substantial 11.5 per 
cent of GDP in 2014, and there was a looming crisis as unemployment was and is high, and the 
country has a relatively small tax base. Likewise, Kantor argues that in South Africa with 
staggering unemployment rates and public sector benefits through union legal powers, the number 
of jobs available is minimal (2017: 105-106). Karodia et. al (2016:52) argue that the high public 
sector wage bill also contributes to national debt. Moreover, as argued by Schreiber (2018:104), 
the politicisation of the public sector through the use of cadre deployment has also crippled the 
public sector by draining of expertise. As political connections have been at the centre of public 
sector employment contracts, the public sector encompassed millions of overpaid workers without 
the necessary skills for the job. Consequently, by 2016, the rapid expansion of the sector did not 
translate into significant improvements in productivity (Schreiber, 2018:104). As such, Kantor 
(2017:82) asserts that the money spent on public sector employees could have been allocated to 
poverty eradication programmes, housing, education, health, and other pressing issues. Amongst 
many other financial issues, the unemployment rate was on 26.7 per cent in 2016, an eight-year 
high (Marin and Solomon, 2016:21). These issues suggest that the size of the public sector with 
preferential treatment, is one factor contributing to the slow progress in improving the lives of 
ordinary South Africans.   
As the economy has worsened over the years due to a number of factors, Desai and Vahed argue 
that the economic deterioration has catalysed dissatisfaction amongst the population (2017:33). 
One contributing factor to fiscal instability is the government’s extensive public sector wage bill, 
leaving less resources are available for other pressing issues (Ibid). The poor service delivery is 
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most devastating for working families and the poor, who are more reliant on government services 
than the middle class and the wealthy (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:55). Moreover, unequal access 
to adequate health and education facilities replicates historical, racialised patterns of inequality 
(Ibid). As such, contrary to Greene’s statement, an increase size of the public sector within a 
context of high inequality and few economic prospects might turn voters away from the ANC. 
Moreover, the reluctance of unions to expanding into the informal sector and part-time work might 
make trade union mobilisation and campaigning for the party limited to those already employed 
in the public sector, thus having a marginal effect. 
Even so, the public sector cannot be deem the only contributing factor to fiscal instability. The 
following chapter will discuss the diversion of public funds. Related to this is the role of self-
enrichment. As such, the following chapter will elaborated upon the consequences of publicly 
known extent of elite enrichment, in a context of destructive factionalism (Reddy, 2014:103), and 
a deteriorating economy.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter presented the theoretical framework to understand patronage 
employment and unions. The Resource Theory regards compliance by the client in the client-
patron relationship as natural due to an alignment of interests in which the blurring of lines between 
state and party benefits everyone in the party. This chapter has looked at the direct economic costs 
of the public sector and unions. As issues related to patronage employment and resources are 
interconnected, patronage employment in a context of the diversion of public funds will be 
explored in the following chapter.  
81 
 
This chapter confirmed an expansion of the South African public service, as well as its increased 
politicisation in favour of the ruling party. However, the public sector does not only encompass 
ANC-affiliated personnel. In early ANC rule, when there was little political control over the state 
bureaucracy, many public servants from the old regime kept their positions. In 2006 the ANC lost 
control over Cape Town, which was later followed by the loss of Pretoria, Johannesburg and 
Nelson Mandela Bay in 2016. Nonetheless, in the last national elections in 2014 the ANC was 
faced with its weakest election result. As such, prior to the 2016 municipal election, we can assume 
that a significant majority of public servants were ANC-aligned. Later, despite declining electoral 
support, there are few indications that an increase in the size of the public sector in combination 
with high political control has had an effect on electoral dominance. It should also be noted that 
these trends are not specific to SPD systems, as democracies such as Italy and the United States 
show similar trends. On the theme of labour unions, I have argued that COSATU’s influence has 
decreased over the years, thus diminishing its utility for the ANC.  
In the final section, it was argued that the public sector, protected by favourable wage and work-
related benefits through the legal powers of the unions, is one of the major contributors to fiscal 
instability in South Africa. Furthermore, in a context of economic deterioration and increased 
public outcry, money spent on the public sector could be allocated to more pressing matters. In 
sum, I have argued that the cost of the public sector has an indirect effect on voter dissatisfaction 
towards the ruling party which will consequently lead to a decrease of votes on election day.  
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Chapter 5: State-Owned Enterprises  
5.1 Introduction  
“If I were the dictator for just six months everything would be sorted.” Former President Jacob 
Zuma, 2016 (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:96)  
The previous chapter traced the development of the ANC’s control of the public sector and its 
electoral dominance. It showed that while the ANC’s control over the public sector has increased, 
it has not had the effect of increasing electoral dominance. Another factor affecting dominance, 
provided by Greene, is the ability of the party to leverage available resources and direct them to 
secure dominance. Greene asserts that the level of state participation within State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) can be seen as a proxy for the relative magnitude of patronage resources 
(2007a:20; 2010b:307). As patronage employment is essential component within this theme the 
argument from previous chapter will be further explored in this chapter. This chapter provides an 
overall judgement on the correlation between patronage employment, state-controlled resources 
and electoral dominance.  
5.2 Control over SOEs and Party Dominance 
A central part of Greene’s Resource Theory revolves around the illicit use of public resources for 
partisan aims (2010a:31). As such, he reasons that prospects for generating patronage are 
dependent on the size and level of politicisation of public sector. It is however almost impossible 
to measure its magnitude of resources for partisan purposes directly, as there are not reliable data 
available. Therefore, he the degree of state control over economy provides us with an indication 
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of the magnitude. His theory does not denote that all public sector resources are used for patronage 
for the ruling party, rather that the magnitude of state’s control over the economy affect 
accessibility (Ibid). Within this argument, SOEs are used as a proxy for the relative magnitude of 
patronage resources over time, due to the economic significance of these companies (Greene, 
2007b:20). These large companies are typically operating in strategic industries such as energy, 
telecommunications, manufacturing and transport. The argument is two-fold: state involvement in 
these companies means more resources are controlled by the ruling party, which also means more 
public sector jobs are available for partisan distribution and more state capacity to offer economic 
protection and favours for political support (Greene, 2007a:20). SOEs are therefore important to 
sustaining party dominance as they allow the dominant party to turn the state into the party’s 
personal piggy bank. 
Furthermore, these companies allow easy access to funds with little risk of public scrutiny (Greene, 
2007a:40). One reason for this is that there is often a blurred line between the roles of directors 
and high-level political appointees, as in SOEs directors may assume both roles. Secondly, their 
finances tend to be hidden from public view and transfers from the national government are 
numerous and hard to track (Ibid).  
Greene argues that privatisation measures will make the governing party less wealthy, and 
opposition parties can compete more fairly for votes (2007b:20, 33). He further argues that with 
the recent waves of privatisation in much of the developing world, dominant parties should become 
a less common phenomenon. In 2007, he predicted liberalisation would end SPD rule in a number 
of countries, including South Africa (Greene, 2007b:20, 33). Contrary to Greene’s assessment of 
South Africa, it is arguable that the particular way privatisation was implemented did not lead 
decreased state control. These developments will be discussed below.     
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5.3 The Case of South Africa  
5.3.1 South Africa SOEs in Historic Perspective  
Over the last few years, the term ‘state capture’ has become a frequently used term to describe a 
political project by a well-organised network aimed at extracting large-scale state resources, with 
the use of SOEs being a central mechanism of obtaining the resources (Bhorat et al., 2017:3). 
Chipkin and Swilling (2018:1-2) argue that what we refer to as ‘state capture’ is not a new 
phenomenon in South Africa, but rather a familiar and repeated pattern in its history of state 
formation. It can be seen as early as the invasion of the Dutch East India Company and the 
founding of the Cape Colony, through the era of Cecil Rhodes and later under the leadership of 
the apartheid regime. The apartheid regime was designed to benefit the minority white Afrikaner 
population in general, and a few powerful elites in particular, and control over SOEs were at the 
centre of that project (Ibid).  
Due to this legacy, the ANC government inherited well over 300 SOEs and 50 per cent of South 
African fixed capital assets were under government control when the ANC took office in 1994 
(Jerome, 2006:6). Furthermore, the private sector was controlled by a handful of companies, which 
operated in a loosely-regulated and inherently anti-competitive environment (Jerome, 2006: 6). 
They were used as platforms for employment and social benefits for the minority white population, 
created a support base among the white working class and Afrikaner business owners. Over the 
years, the apartheid regime came under constant criticism due to the inefficiency and recurrent 
capital losses of many of the country’s SOEs (Ibid). Hence, inefficient state control of SOEs is not 
new to South Africa.  
Furthermore, throughout South African history, public procurement has been used as a political 
tool to reach certain social and economic aims (Chipkin and Swinlling, 2018:102). It was a 
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powerful tool in the creation of South Africa’s racially exclusive ‘developmental state’ in the 
1930s and later became a strategic platform of the apartheid project, specifically to benefit a class 
of Afrikaner (nationalist) capitalists over the English-speaking (imperialist) capitalists. The state 
could use its purchasing power and procurement contacts to redirect the market (Ibid).  
Similarly, the redesigning of public procurement in the 1990s was based on the idea that the 
government’s purchases of goods and services would incentivise the emergence of black-owned 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (Freund, 2006:11). The concept of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE), which emerged in the early 1990s, was based on the idea that there was a 
need to increase black ownership of shares in major corporations, in response to structural racial 
injustices, with the state playing a significant role (Ponte et al, 2007:1; Jerome, 2006:7). While the 
need for economic redistribution and policies to address historic inequities are necessary, BEE has 
been subject to harsh criticism over the years for how it, like the NP’s enrichment of white minority 
elite, operates to enrich a small black elite whilst keeping the exploitative relations of production 
intact. Bhorat et al, (2017:2) state that the use of procurement policies directed by arbitrary BBE 
claims have been essential for the diversion of public funds through the use of SOEs. A closer 
examination of the developments in SOE management under Mbeki and Zuma will be presented 
in the following section.  
5.3.2 The Mbeki Administration’s Relationship with SOEs  
 GEAR prescribed a complete privatisation of non-essential SOEs and a partial privatisation of 
others (Gumede, 2007:108). Devan Pillay (2011:69) claims that this made Mbeki more unpopular 
amongst certain factions of the ANC and its partners in the alliance. In March 2011, Zwelinzima 
Vavi, the General Secretary of COSATU, argued that there was a need for a much larger role of 
the state in sectors in which jobs could be created, including SOEs (Pillay, 2011:69). Jakkie Cillers 
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and Ciara Aucoin (2016:4) describe GEAR as essentially being a self-imposed structural 
adjustment programme. In fact, it did place South Africa on a rapid growth trajectory with 
increased improvements in productivity. Mbeki’s determination to keeping the rand strong and 
attracting FDI did however come at the cost of not addressing many of South Africa’s pressing 
development needs (Aucoin, 2016:4; Gumede, 2007:126). Based on these statements, Greene’s 
argument that South Africa had taken a path towards increased privatisation and less state control. 
However, as will be argued, the ANC under Mbeki was centred more around restructuring rather 
than privatisation. Hence, the state still played a significant role in directing the economy.  
Gumede (2007:128) argues that significant privatisation took place: from 1997 to 2004 eighteen 
SOEs were privatised. From these privatisations the government raised R26.8 billion, of which 
R12 billion was allocated towards the reduction of the national debt. However, An opposing view 
is presented by Rumney (2005:403) who argues that the privatisation of SOEs under Mbeki was 
restricted and slow. Picher (2012:245) agrees that steps towards privatisation were limited to a few 
SOEs and were conducted in a slow and calculated manner. She highlights that by 2003 the 
government had only sold around nine per cent of state assets. SOEs still owned 44 per cent of 
fixed capital assets, which amounted to fourteen per cent of GDP. The most significant SOEs were 
not privatised, such as electricity supply and generation, weapon production, telecommunications, 
and transport services. Instead, these were reconfigured to allow for closer connections with 
private investors in order to rationalise operations and form ties with historically disadvantaged 
firms, as well as to pacify trade unions and their industries. SOEs with high economic importance 
for the economy were protected from further privatisation (Pitcher, 2012:245). 
Jerome (2006:1-2) argues that South Africa’s methods of restructuring and privatisation under 
Mbeki’s leadership was unconventional from a global perspective. The ANC under Mbeki’s 
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leadership was sceptical of full privatisation and instead opted for partial privatisation by selling 
equity to ‘strategic equity partners’ and Black Empowerment groups all the while holding on to a 
majority interest (Ibid). Telkom, the Airports Company and South African Airways stand as 
examples of this practice under his leadership. Furthermore, the Mbeki government tended to 
prefer involving foreign investors, albeit only as minority partners (Jerome, 2006:1-2). 
Horwitz and Currie (2007:459-460) argue that Mbeki’s reluctance to transfer control from the 
presidency to external players had a number of consequences. Even in industries where the ANC 
had decided upon privatisation, such as the South African Telecommunications, the approach of 
privatisation did not translate into liberalisation and significant competition. In the case of Telkom, 
privatisation led to an entrenchment of the ANC’s network operator, as the party had shares in the 
company. Therefore, the party had vested interests in the company’s prosperity, and by avoiding 
liberalisation Telkom was shielded from competition (Ibid). Furthermore, they argue that the ANC 
displayed distrust for independent agencies, which has limited regulation and intensified the 
government’s power (Ibid).  
In sum, under Mbeki’s presidency partial privatisation and limited state regulation opened the 
possibilities of accumulating wealth through foreign investment (Southall, 2007:222). In fact, 
purchases by foreign investors accounted for about 40 per cent of total profits from sales of SOEs, 
leading to a scenario where most of the beneficiaries of privatisation were foreign companies 
(Pitcher, 2012:245). Telkom, in particular contributed to this high amount, with American and 
Malaysian buyers. Furthermore, investors from the US, UK, France and Germany became strategic 
equity partners in telecommunications, in the defence industry and in the transport sector, and 
American investors bought tourist resorts (Ibid). 
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5.3.3 Control of SOEs Under the Zuma Administration 
Renwick (2018: 169) state that when Mbeki resigned from the presidency, many were disappointed 
with the limited socio-economic transformation. While the country had seen a rapid development 
of a black middle class, the situation for the poor had not improved significantly (Ibid). This led 
to increased calls for a more radical economic transformation by the African National Congress 
Youth League (ANCYL) (Ibid). In a document published in 2011, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) stated that BEE considerations were often not taken into account in the state’s 
procurement practices (DTI, 2011: 2). The earlier idea of privatising SOEs was discarded, as these 
companies were seen as key instruments implementing what was to be termed “radical economic 
transformation” (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:103). 
On paper, radical economic transformation was a broad and comprehensive plan to form black-
owned small and medium-sized enterprises and reform white businesses by adding requirements 
to employ black people and provide equal treatment (Blythe et al, 2018:7). The aim was to diminish 
the dependence on goodwill of white business owners by forcing structural changes (Ibid). In 
December 2011, the cabinet approved the Preferential Procurement Regulations to align with the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act, (No. 53 of 2003). This allowed the 
department to use R846 billion in public investment programmes to transform the economy 
(Bhorat et al, 2017:40). As of 2010/11, more than R200 billion of SOE expenditure had been 
leveraged in the interests of BEE. A considerable bulk of this money was in only two enterprises, 
Eskom and Transnet, which amounted to two-thirds of the total procurement expenditure of SOEs 
(Ibid).  
Under Zuma’s rule the procurement budget of the state grew exponentially (Chipkin and Swilling, 
2018:45). Over the past 20 years the value of goods and services purchased by the state, chiefly 
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from the private sector, has expanded to between R400 and R500 billion per annum. This reflects 
the near-complete outsourcing of the government’s primary functions (Bhorat et al, 2017:12). 
Paradoxically, while the government has fewer functions, the state bureaucracy has swollen, as 
seen by the increased number of personnel, ministries, departments, agencies and entities (Ibid). 
Under Zuma the state has been turned into an enormous tender-generating machine (Chipkin and 
Swilling, 2018:45). In work done for the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI), Brunette and 
his colleagues label South Africa a ‘contract state’ as state capacity is measured through its ability 
to tap into and manage, through contractual relations, private sector capacities (2014:9). While this 
could be a system for allocating beneficial rents for development purposes, in practice this has 
granted multiple opportunities for entrenching clientelism and patronage networks dependent on 
the goodwill of decision-makers (Bhorat et al, 2017:12, Burnette et al, 2014:9).  
In sum, restructuring throughout ANC rule has not translated into a smaller role of the state in the 
economy. In fact, it increased considerably under former president Zuma. The following section 
will take a closer look at corruption and patronage employment under the two presidents. While 
both precedencies will be covered, special attention will be devoted to Zuma’s leadership, since 
electoral dominance has decreased under his rule and the extent of publically known corruption.   
5.3.4 Corruption Under Mbeki and Zuma  
The Resource Theory predicts that access to state resources, with SOEs being a proxy, helps the 
dominant party sustain itself (Greene, 2007a:20). Similarly, Southall (2007:222) argues that SOEs 
were an important instrument for cementing ANC power under the Mbeki Administration and that 
this bolstering was justified under the banner of promoting further opportunities for an expanding 
black middle class, extending black control over the economy and stimulating black 
empowerment. However, Saliem Fakir (2009:4) states that the focus on BEE as a tool for 
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transformation in the Mbeki administration did not transform SOEs into drivers for relocating 
economic power, as the main result was the handover of shares from the white economy to a 
limited number of people within the ANC cadre of black elites. Southall (2007:223) reason that 
BEE even created hindrances to economic transformation, primarily by creating opportunities for 
corruption in BEE deals (Ibid).  
Moreover, corruption was made possible as the partial privatisations lacked regulations. In 
addition, privatisation as set out by Mbeki was limited to non-core assets, which are relatively 
affordable for black investors although often in direct or indirect association with established 
corporations. These have frequently been supported by state-controlled finance organised by 
institutions like the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) and National Empowerment Fund (NEF) 
(Southall, 2007:222). On the whole, this meant the selling off of the ‘family silver’ for foreign 
capital without any actual handover of economic resources to black people (Southall, 2007:222). 
While Telkom was a partial exception (the government still owns a 40 per cent share), overall 
there were no major allocations of resources to private hands (Ibid). As such, the liberalisation 
trends in South Africa described by Greene, is only reflected on the surface. Closer scrutiny shows 
high levels of state control in the economy.  
Shortly after the announcement of GEAR, a number of key black individuals, many of whom had 
significant political connections, were appointed to leadership positions in the major SOEs and 
public financial institutions (Southall, 2007:223). For instance, in 1996 Saki Macozoma, a 
prominent member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee, stepped down from his position 
in Parliament and was appointed as Deputy Managing Director of Transnet. Later, in 1999, his 
deputy, Mafika Mkwanzi, was awarded the position. In Telkom, Sizwe Nxasana held the position 
of CEO from 1990 to 2005 (Ibid). 
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Similarly, under the Zuma presidency there has been evidence of corruption where SOEs played a 
significant role. This has been coined ‘State Capture’ (Hart and Nassimbeni, 2018:6). Much of the 
evidence was brought to public view following the publication of the The State Capture Report by 
the former Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela (Ibid). The more than 350-page report asserted that 
corruption and personal enrichment are structural and extensive and documented the involvement 
of one prominent business family -the “Guptas” -in the appointment prominent positions (Wolf, 
2017:2). This included ministerial positions and directorships of SOEs and led to the improper and 
corrupt awarding of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family’s business empire. Moreover, 
bribes have been wide-spread (Ibid). 
For instance, former Deputy Minister of Finance, Mcebisi Jonas, claimed that one of the Gupta 
brothers had offered him the position of Minister of Finance. He also declared that Ajay Gupta had 
told him in the same meeting that the Gupta family had already accumulated R6 billion from state 
contacts, with the goal of increasing that amount to R8 billion (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:25). 
Shortly, after the publication of the report, an anonymous source leaked between 100,000 and 
200,000 emails from the Gupta network (Wolf, 2017:3-4). This leak, which was given the name 
#GuptaLeaks, indicates that the State Capture Report had only scratched the surface of the extent 
of financial abuses by members of government. The emails revealed a far greater influence over 
cabinet and other appointments by the Guptas that had been in force since May 2009, or since 
Zuma became president. The Guptas bragged of their achievement of making Zuma’s son 
Duduzane a billionaire. They had also bought Zuma a R331 million mansion and helped his son 
buy a R18 million luxury apartment in Dubai. As for the Guptas themselves, state contracts had 
generated financial benefits that ran into billions of rand (Ibid).  
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Greene (2007a:20) argues that when the dominant party is able to divert large funds from SOEs, 
it the state may offer economic protection in exchange for political support. Based on the evidence 
provided regarding the Zuma-Gupta relation, this statement seems to be reflected in the South 
African case. Faull (2017:4) argues that business people and politicians linked to Gupta and Zuma 
networks have benefitted financially by acquiring political control. For instance, the Gupta-owned 
Oakbay Capital appointed British public relations firm Bell Pottinger to create defence tactics 
against state capture allegations to be used by the Zuma and Gupta families, in addition to those 
allied to them. Early in 2016, this British company’s employees were writing speeches and 
arguments for the allies of the two families, which were then spread by Gupta-owned media outlets 
and twitter accounts to enforce the image that Zuma was being unfairly criticised by media. The 
price for the political support provided by the Bell Pottinger firm was over R1.5 million per month 
(Ibid).     
Under Zuma, there was an extensive system of rewards and punishments, as proposed by Greene 
(2010a:25-26). Firstly, this necessitated centralized control of the president. After the 2014 
elections, the president was able to increase his political control of the public bureaucracy (Chipkin 
and Swilling, 2018:40). From 2014, the National Macro Organisation of State (NMOS) steering 
committee was to report directly to the president (Bhorat et al, 2017:17). This allowed the president 
to place loyal individuals where he needed them and control rent-seeking activities. As such, 
government ministers, acting in concert with private interests, received access to rent-seeking 
opportunities through blackmailing businesses. These were legitimised through regulatory 
instruments or policy decisions, albeit interpreted arbitrarily to favour particular interests (Ibid). 
These businesses were forced to accede to the demands of the government with the warning that 
they would lose a licence or not be rewarded a contract, or not have their contract renewed (Chipkin 
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and Swilling, 2018:40). Preferential treatment of a specific business, faction or group guided the 
decision-making process. Often, people within business had to commit to a number of financial 
and non-financial promises prior to deals being approved (Ibid). Desai and Vahed (2017:40) 
contend that the competition for who is rewarded tenders has become the main focus of all levels 
of government at the expense of adequate service delivery and job creation.  
The use of rewards and punishment can also be seen in terms of SOEs. Eberhard and Godinho 
(2017:6) deduce that towards the end of the 2000s, the already-existing polarisation reached new 
heights as political interests increased on the boards and executive positions of SOEs in general, 
with Transnet and Eskom especially well-infiltrated. A possible indication that there may have 
been punishment for noncompliance is when the former Minster of Public Enterprises, Barbara 
Hogan, resisted the emerging trend of private wealth accumulation among leaders of SOEs. It is 
believed that Hogan stood in the way of Zuma’s planned SOE board appointments as ANC 
structures were appointing loyal comrades to top Eskom positions. The minister was dismissed 
from her position 18 months later, and while we cannot know for certain, it is very likely that the 
dismissal was a direct punishment for engaging in gate-keeper politics (Ibid).  
Hogan’s replacement as Minister of Public Enterprises in November 2010 was Malusi Gigaba. In 
June 2011, Minister Gigaba undertook the most drastic board restructuring in Eskom’s then history 
where only two non-executive board members kept their positions (Eberhard and Godinho, 
2017:6). Additionally, many of Eskom’s most respected executives resigned within this timeframe 
due to the negative shift in institutional culture and early outbreak of systematic fraud and political 
interference (Ibid). As Greene (2010b:259-260) illustrated in his study on SPD in Mexico, the PRI 
created a system where behaviour that favoured the Party was rewarded and resistance was 
penalised. One indication supporting the claim that appointments, promotions and dismissals are 
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decided based on compliance to patronage contracts by the client is the suspiciously high 
restructuring level of appointments in the face of lucrative deals (Eberhard and Godinho, 2017:6). 
In 2015, for example, the Eskom governance structures were compromised, as revealed by the 
high turnover, volatility, and tension within and across the board, executive and senior 
management. Furthermore, there is a significant time overlap between restructuring and conflict, 
and the most severe accusations of capture of Eskom leadership, procurement, and operations 
(Ibid).  
5.4 The Use of State Resources for Party Benefits  
One of the basic themes in Greene’s work is the creation of a ‘spoils’ system whereby the 
interdependence between political and business elites are extensive. For him, this implies a wide-
spread network of patronage. Greene assumes a link between the diversion of public funds for 
partisan use and the offering of financial benefits in exchange for political support, which in turn 
will translate into electoral dominance (Greene, 2007a:40).  
Olver, Buthelezi and Brunette (2017:3-6) assert that state resources have been used to benefit the 
ANC in a number of ways. Firstly, in line with Greene’s framework, the ANC benefits itself by 
denying other parties the same access to a range of state resources, as well as by using the 
administration as base for party political activities. Resources are being used in election campaigns 
including through the use of non-financial state assets like vehicles, buildings and staff. The party 
receives additional funding because of its control of the state apparatus, where these funds are 
collected through business interests, membership fees and assets raised by regional structures 
(Ibid).  
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In addition, the party places an obligation on their public representatives to donate to the party on 
a monthly basis (Olver et al., 2017:3-6). The ANC has been known to put a price on contact with 
government elites. For instance, the Progressive Business Forum created by the ANC overtly sells 
seats to events where delegates can meet those further up ‘the hierarchy’ and network for business 
opportunities (Ibid). The misuse of state resources and patronage employment are instruments, and 
the institutional capacity is intentionally destabilised for this purpose. This generates a malicious 
cycle in which the state is gradually and systematically weakened to achieve goals unrelated to the 
public interest and in which there is little difference between the party and the state (Ibid). 
Evidence suggests that large amounts of money have been channelled to the party for re-election 
purposes; for instance, there are allegations of Russian donations backing the ANC with funding 
for local government elections, which can explain how the ANC was able to obtain R1 billion for 
the election campaign (Bhorat et al, 2017:17). In exchange, Zuma and his allies committed 
themselves to the nuclear deal with the Russians without procedural public engagement (Ibid).  
Booysen (2014:24) states that at all levels of government, political leaders and officials have used 
their positions to benefit the party. For example, prior to the 2014 national and provincial elections, 
reports of state resources being used illicitly for ANC campaigning increased. There was evidence 
of the ANC supplying large amounts of campaign handouts to communities, including food 
parcels, blankets and bicycles, prior to campaign visits by the ANC leadership (Ibid). Certainly, 
the ANC has economic capacity to outcompete the opposition in terms of broadcasting their 
message, mobilize citizens and provide material gifts. Nonetheless, as will be argued in the next 
section: the use of public funds might under certain conditions may not be the catalysts of sustained 
electoral dominance, as proposed by Greene.  
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5.4.1 Resources and Electoral Dominance  
While there is evidence of public resources being channelled to the ANC for re-election purposes, 
ANC dominance has decreased over the years. This section seeks to provide some potential 
explanations for these trends.  
Firstly, I propose the same argument as presented in chapter three, namely his assumption that 
SPD systems are characterized by benefits being party-specific rather than individual-specific 
(Greene, 2007a:40). Consequently, the nature of the system means that everyone in the party 
benefits from raiding the assets of the state, where the party excels at patronage (Greene, 
2007a:60). However, this assumption makes the Resource Theory unable to predict the potential 
damaging effects of resource competition within the dominant party.     
Like Greene, Reddy (2014:104) argues that career politicians will seek entrance into the ruling 
party due to the predictability of election outcomes in DPS. However, while Greene sees this solely 
as benefitting the dominant party, Reddy’s dismissal of the party as being one unified actor, might 
prove useful for explaining why state resources can have a negative effect on electoral dominance 
(2014:104). He states that the nature of SPD diminishes inter-party competition and relocates it 
within the dominant party, thus leading to factionalism (Ibid).  
Although, under certain conditions, factionalism is not inherently destructive and in fact co-
operative fractionalisation can promote broader consensus-building strategies in which various 
interests are advanced (Reddy, 2014:104). It does, however, have the potential to become highly 
destructive. Reddy argues that this is especially applicable to former liberation movements in 
government. For instance, the ANC as a liberation movement and its early tenure in office suggest 
that groups with different ideological stances could work towards a common goal of democracy 
for all (2014:104). In fact, Reddy states that under Mandela’s rule the diversity of the ANC was 
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not believed to be problematic because the president’s charisma and popularity allowed for a 
lessening of party-state tensions (Ibid). While state capture has been a part of ANC rule for a long 
time, the ANC has remained fairly functional and was hence easier to hide (Marin and Solomon, 
2016:21). 
Yet, when liberation movement parties have been in power for extended periods of time, 
degenerative factionalism can take over, where the factionalism becomes so destructive that it 
poses a real threat to the coherence and stability of the party (Reddy, 2014:102-104). This is seen 
in the range of developments from Mandela to Zuma in the continuous expansion of cabinet posts. 
As such, the expansion of the public sector might not be a sign of strength, but rather weakness.  
In effect, the conflict exists between elites in control of the machinery of the state and those in 
control of the party machine. This competition can become so sinister that the party deteriorates 
from within. In this case, factions are in hostile competition with each other over positions in 
government that allow for enrichment through the state coffers, although often disguised as 
ideological differences. Under president Mbeki, factional conflicts between the president and 
Zuma signified two different ‘centres of power’. As many of the structures of the past were still 
intact, whereby the white elites sustained their monopoly in all spheres except political power, the 
factions competed over positions within the state for the accumulation of resources (Ibid).  
Likewise, Netshitenzhe (2012:1) argues that within the ANC the party has fallen under ‘sins of 
incumbency’, in which intra-party patronage and corruption are embedded. In the chase for 
numbers, each delegate’s vote comes with a price, and toxic leadership precipitates toxic members, 
in which financial and non-financial benefits determine the results. In sum, money has become the 
basis for obtaining leadership positions at all levels of government, and intra-party politics revolve 
around haggling for allegiance and assets, overshadowing anything programmatic or ideological 
98 
 
(Ibid). Michaela Elsbeth Martin and Hussain Solomon (2016:29) argue that there are several signs 
that self-enrichment politics are tearing the party apart. Under Zuma, the independent powers of 
the state have significantly decreased. A string of warlords and patronage lords are running the 
provinces, and below them a new class of businessmen and government managers collaborate on 
diverting as many state resources as possible. Competition has turned so sinister and money-driven 
that assassinations of political affiliates within the ANC have taken place (Ibid). Reddy (2014:103) 
states that widespread corruption becomes a norm, in which public resources are necessary tools 
for gathering support. Consequently, party leaders become dependent on a steady stream of 
resources to sustain and expand their networks, with factions entrenching themselves deeply in the 
party organisation, using their political power to win public office, amass resources, and make 
exchanges for support on the ground. As the state does not have infinite amounts of resources, 
clashes between factions escalate and at some point the system becomes unsustainable without 
dismantling the party organisation (Ibid).  
But as Grindle (2010:28) states, patronage systems are often riddled with factions and conflict. 
The behaviour of many patronage-appointed officials corresponds with the stereotype of 
incompetence, corruption and bad governance that is often the presumed consequence of 
patronage, in which many public sector positions are filled by short-term unqualified personnel. 
In fact, these systems are often linked to dysfunctional public services, as the spoils of winning 
office or the cost of cementing political alliances take a toll (Grindle, 2012:29). Olver et al (2017:8) 
state that the party is in need of funds for a number of campaign activities, ranging from purchasing 
of merchandise, funding rallies and conferences, covering travel expenses, and paying for media 
coverage. However, these resources have become limited due to factionalism, as resources are 
channelled via factions rather via the party itself (Ibid). 
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Moreover, extensive spoils for self-enrichment often has had severe consequences for the 
economy. Martin and Solomon (2016:21) state as the South African economy has deteriorated over 
the years, and state capture can no longer be concealed. For instance, as of 2016, exports and 
commodity prices were decreasing and the rand was collapsing. In the first quarter of 2016 the 
economy shrank by 1.2 per cent, combined with an unemployment rate of 26.7 per cent – the 
highest in eight years. In addition, business confidence was lower than it had been for more than 
two decades (Ibid).  
The country’s SOEs were in no better condition than the economy as a whole. John Kane-Berman 
(2016:1) highlights the constantly published reports of financial catastrophe, corruption, bad 
governance, political interference, chaos, or sometimes all of the above, within these companies. 
Some of the largest SOEs, such as South African Airways (SAA) and Eskom, would not exist 
without government guarantees assisting them financially through loans. Kene-Berman (2016:5) 
argues that SOEs have become the playground of crony capitalism, which has led to a deterioration 
of their organisational integrity: they are financially broken and their corporate brands have 
shattered. SOEs have become an instrument to enrich the elites at the expense of the people. Those 
who benefit the most are chief executives, board members and politicians. The main beneficiaries 
of the spoils obtained through SOEs have been both local and foreign businesspeople (Ibid). 
Moreover, Chipkin and Swilling (2018:25) note that the vast amounts of financial resources 
obtained by foreign forces, such the Gupta family, have been moved offshore and contribute 
nothing to the South African economy.  
These government guarantees are a threat to the state’s own financial stability which is being 
meticulously checked by international credit rating agencies. Without a significant reduction of 
state debt, South Africa’s credit rating will be downgraded to ‘sub-investment’, or ‘junk’, status. 
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One consequence may be an upsurge in borrowing costs, which will in turn limit the amount of 
resources available for social spending (Kane-Berman, 2016:1). Consequently, Martin and 
Solomon (2016:12) state that spoils of the state can be overlooked until they are so extensive that 
there is a complete deterioration of administrative control, party unity and provision of public 
goods. These trends were becoming more evident under Zuma, with the clear deterioration of the 
party’s image from an external point of view, as well as internally (Ibid).  
For these multiple reasons, voter dissatisfaction seems to have been increasing over the years, as 
seen by a growing domestic protest movement regarding service provision, labour issues, 
unemployment, university fees and staffing, as well as the anti-Zuma protests prior to Zuma’s 
resignation (Cilliers and Aucoin, 2016:6). Many of these protests are directly linked to government 
performance. Lastly, Southall (2011:9) argues that the extent of exposure in the media is dependent 
on the prevailing balance of power within the governing party. While we do not know the full 
extent of dubious exchanges, Southall asserts that forms of corruption are often exposed as a result 
of intense factional clashes for resources. We can assume that the number of unrevealed corruption 
deals is high, but that increased disunity within the party will result in increased leakage to the 
public (Southall, 2011:9).  
These vignettes have demonstrated that there has been a blurring between the party and state, 
where state resources have been used to aid enrichment of a few. However, this enrichment does 
not appear to be benefitted the party as whole. The South African case might indicate an interaction 
between three components. Firstly, the economy suffers from intra-party competition for 
resources, which also intensifies this competition, contributing to a further economic decline 
(Reddy, 2014:104). The third component, which is linked to the two first elements, is public 
scrutiny. Martin and Solomon (2016:21) argue that as the party becomes less functional it becomes 
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more difficult to hide corruption from the public. In sum, citizens may turn away from the party, 
either by voting for the opposition or abstaining from voting when the party is unable to provide 
public goods due to economic and administrative constraints stemming from obvious large-scale 
corruption (Ibid). Kane-Berman (2016:29) states that the extensive personal gain of top politicians 
and/or business elites has also led to increasing dissatisfaction amongst a growing number of ANC 
members, the SACP, and the COSATU leadership elites, as well as to the general public. He further 
argues that the malfeasance of state companies, notwithstanding the fact that the extent is 
unknown, may have been a cause of decreased electoral dominance in the latest local elections 
(Ibid). In sum, personal enrichment seems to override policies to reduce socio-economic 
grievances amongst the population. This has contributed to a culture of self-enrichment among 
members within the ANC that overrides party interests.  
While Greene (2007a:259) maintains that his theory is applicable to both democratic and 
authoritarian SPD systems, the South African case indicate otherwise. The PRI in Mexico had one 
advantage that the ANC does not. The PRI had full control over the media Hallin (2000:85). 
Similar signs of attempted government control over media was starting to appear around 2010 in 
South Africa (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:2). For instance, a majority of members of Parliament 
from the ANC voted to pass the Protection of State Information Bill, which would give government 
officials the right to classify government information as ‘top secret’ to any information considered 
to be in the ‘national interest’ (Thomas and Sookrajowa, 2017:39). Bills are passed in the lower 
house of parliament comprising of ANC and opposition party representatives, and a two-third 
majority is required. However, it is based on a proportional representative formula that favours the 
ANC (Ibid). The Protection of State Information Bill would entail that journalists could be 
sentenced to prison for reporting on state issues (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:2). However, unlike 
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Mexico, South Africa’s judiciary is independent, and the bill was dropped as it was believed that 
the Constitutional Court would oppose the bill (Ibid). As such, the Resource Theory might not be 
as applicable to democratic SPD states.  
Schreiber (2018:18) offers a similar explanation as has just been argued. He states that the 
combination of endemic corruption, rising crime rates, economic devastation, and the party’s 
unwillingness to take accountability for Zuma’s patronage network has progressively eroded 
electoral support since 2009, and in fact this trend has greatly intensified after the 2014 election 
(Ibid). Greene (2007a) argues that the opposition will not be able to capitalise on this 
dissatisfaction before the ruling party has lost its stronghold on the state machinery. However, this 
might not be reflected in the South African case. As has been extensively argued, the South African 
public sector show high levels of politicisation. Even though there have been no national elections 
after 2014, the local elections of 2016 give us an indication of voter loyalty. The local election 
results of 2016 provide show a strengthening of the opposition (Schreiber, 2018:37). As such, 
Greene’s argument that a ruling party must lose significant control over the state apparatus and the 
economy in order for citizens to cast their votes for the opposition is arguable. In sum, a skewed 
electoral playing field in which the dominant party has a considerably larger resource advantage 
might have limited power to explain SPDs.      
5.5 Conclusion  
The case of ANC dominance in post-apartheid South Africa shows that there have been increased 
levels of diversion of public funds and a decrease of electoral support. In fact, the ANC has seen 
a steady, albeit relatively slow, erosion of its dominance.  
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In 2010, Greene predicted that the ANC would lose electoral support as the country had embarked 
on a path towards liberalisation. Economic theory states that the privatisation of an economy 
decreases state control of the economy. Although South Africa has taken steps towards the 
privatisation of non-core assets, it has been argued that the way in which privatisation has been 
implemented has not translated to less state control.  Moreover, throughout South Africa’s history 
SOEs have been a central political tool that benefit certain groups of people. A second instrument 
for amassing power and wealth has been the use of public procurement policies. In the apartheid 
era, SOEs and public procurement were used for the enrichment of white elites. Likewise, under 
the ANC BEE policies have been an essential strategy for diverting public funds through the use 
of SOEs. Due to BEE policies, the power vested in the president, and the lack of independent 
control systems, patronage employment and corruption have been able to go unchecked. 
Additionally, an extensive system of rewards and punishments has allowed for widespread 
corruption deals to take place both within government and on the boards of SOEs.  
As predicted by Greene, the ANC’s election campaigns have out-competed the opposition through 
the use of the state apparatus. The party is granted a range of financial resources ranging from non-
financial state assets, funding from private business donors, and membership fees. The institutional 
capacity of the state has been intentionally weakened and destabilised for political partisan 
purposes. Although this thesis confirms Greene’s claim that patronage employment and access to 
public funds benefit the dominant party over the opposition, it has been argued that resource 
advantages do not always translate into increased electoral dominance. In fact, resources might 
even decrease electoral dominance within certain contexts.  
I have argued that the main theoretical weakness of the Resource Theory is found in the definition 
of the dominant party. By conceptualising the party as a unified unit in which all members of the 
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dominant party benefit equally, the theory does not sufficiently address the potential destructive 
effects of intra-party competition. While Greene argues that the nature of SPD systems minimises 
factionalism within the dominant party, I have argued that these systems transfer competition 
between parties to inside the dominant party. In particular, former liberation movements in 
government are more prone to factionalism, as the party encompasses many different groups of 
people.  
Within the party, as seen in the case of the ANC, conflicts between elites in control of the 
machinery of the state and those in control of the party machine can become highly destructive. 
These have the potential to become so destructive, as argued in the case of South Africa, that the 
party is deteriorating from within. The competition over positions in government is a sign of this, 
an indication that an expansion of the public sector is a sign of weakness rather than of strength. 
As wide-spread corruption becomes the norm, politicians become more dependent on a constant 
stream of resources to maintain support from their constituencies.  
Moreover, as seen in the case of South Africa, the constant need for resources and the breakdown 
of the country’s SOEs have dire consequences for the economy as a whole. Therefore, this chapter 
has argued that there is an interaction between three components. Firstly, intra-party competition 
and self-enrichment have catastrophic effects on the economy, additionally economic decline 
works as a catalyst for further intra-party competition. The last factor, which is linked to the two 
first components, is public scrutiny. When party unity is destroyed or has become severely 
dysfunctional, it can no longer conceal the corruption from the public. Moreover, while Greene’s 
claim that the Resource Theory is applicable to both democratic and authoritarian SPD systems, 
the South African case does not confirm this as the democratic elements within the country provide 
citizens with the knowledge of state corruption. In a context where the economy is in ruins, public 
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goods are for the most part not provided, and citizens are aware of the corruption within 
government, voter dissatisfaction is virtually inevitable which eventually leads citizens to break 
their allegiance to the party. As such, while resources might aid electoral dominance in certain 
contexts, it has also the potential to become the source of electoral decay for the party. In sum, 
there are few indications that asymmetrical access to resources between political parties in and of 
itself can explain party dominance.      
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Chapter 6: Conclusion of Thesis 
 “Domination takes the zest from political life, simultaneously bringing stability. The dominant 
party wears itself out in office, it loses its vigour, its arteries harden. It would be possible to 
show that every domination bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction.” Duverger 
(1954:312).     
 
6.1 Revisiting the Problem Statement 
The purpose of this study has been to evaluate Greene’s Resource Theory using South Africa under 
the ANC as an illustrative case to contribute to the field of SPD research. The research topic was 
chosen due to the limited understanding of what sustains these systems. The final chapter will 
present the research findings and provide suggestions for further research.  
The thesis began by presenting the reader with the theoretical foundations of Kenneth Greene’s 
Resource Theory that he developed based on research on the prolonged dominance of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico. The main assumptions in the theory were 
divided into three separate chapters: policy appeals, patronage employment and labour unions, and 
state-owned enterprises as proxy for the dominant party’s resource advantage. As these three 
themes do overlap to some extent, the chapter five encompassed how in reality patronage 
employment unfolds in relation to public resources. The research study was guided by one research 
question, and supplemented by two sub-questions: 
To what extent can Greene’s resource theory help to explain one-party dominance? 
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a) To what extent does resource advantage help us understand the ANC’s electoral 
dominance?  
b) How does Greene’s theory address intra-party competition and the potential 
consequences thereof?  
These research questions were explored by using an analytical framework that problematised the 
imprecision of a number of theoretical concepts from political science used in the Resource 
Theory. The identification of theoretical weaknesses was used to explore alternative explanations 
for the electoral rise and later decline of the ANC. By doing so, overall judgement could be made 
on whether asymmetrical access to resources sustains dominance.  
6.2 Findings  
The first theoretical weaknesses were uncovered in chapter three on policy appeals, and these 
proved to be of relevance throughout the research study. The median voter theory was highlighted 
as problematic, due to its vagueness in terms of testability. I argued that the median voter exists 
only in theory but is impossible to identity. The properties of the median mean that preferences 
remain fairly stable over time even in cases where society is undergoing significant change. The 
catch-all party was identified as an alternative term, although this term is also hampered by its 
subjective nature. The field of political science is particularly challenged compared other research 
fields such as mathematics, due to the subjective nature of what one is trying to study. This 
subjectivity brought about further complications when examining Greene’s claims about liberation 
legacies. In sum, both policy preferences of the median voter and liberation credentials cannot be 
measured.  
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Moreover, Greene’s policy assumptions cannot be separated from control over the state apparatus 
and resources. Again, the theory presents the reader with arbitrary terms as he states that the 
dominant party must have “acceptable” policy appeals in combination with patronage resources. 
Although he states that the ruling party reaches dominant status after a four-election or 20-year 
mark, it is unclear at what point before that the dominant party has significant electoral advantage 
over the opposition, at which point the party can freely choose its policy stance. All these factors 
which have been discussed now contribute to the inability to make any conclusive statements of 
how polices affect SPD systems.  
The final section on policy appeals went beyond the issues of imprecise theoretical terms and 
explored the potential weaknesses of a number of core assumptions. The main concern was the 
fundamental assumptions of the nature of SPD systems, in which the party is defined as one unit. 
Since the theory assumes that every member of the dominant party is driven by the same interests, 
it cannot account for intra-party competition and factionalisation. I argued that factionalisation has 
direct consequences on which policies are implemented, how they are communicated, as well as 
influencing liberation discourses. Moreover, seeing the dominant party as one unit proved to be a 
serious issue which persisted throughout the thesis.  
The following chapter looked at the size and level of politicisation of the public sector, as well as 
the role of labour unions in sustaining dominance, in which the chapter found no relationship. As 
issues related to patronage employment are interconnected to the diversion of public funds and 
patronage activities, the scope of the chapter was limited to the associated direct economic costs. 
The main argument of chapter 4 was that the state outspending on the public sector that is protected 
by their unions has indirectly contributed to increased voter dissatisfaction. The enormous size of 
the public sector in combination with preferential wage and work-related benefits is one 
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contributing factor to fiscal instability, thus leaving fewer resources for other pressing matters. 
Moreover, COSATU has become less influential within society over the years, thereby 
contributing to its diminishing utility for the ANC. 
The final chapter analysed the intersection between patronage employment and access to resources 
for political partisan purposes. It has been argued that South Africa’s path towards liberalisation 
through the privatisation of SOEs has not led to a decreasing role of the state. In fact, through the 
use of procurement policies, lack of independent control systems, limited regulations, and vested 
centralised control of the presidency, restructuring is a more fitting term. In the later years, and 
especially under Zuma’s leadership, widespread corruption has been uncovered. This has been 
possible because of the patronage employment system in which rewards and punishments played 
a significant role.  
Although the ANC has a significant resource advantage due to its control of the state apparatus, I 
have argued that resources alone cannot explain SPD. In fact, within some contexts resources are 
potentially detrimental to electoral support. As in chapter 3, the conceptualisation of the party as 
one unit was found as the main theoretical weakness.  
The Resource Theory is not able to account for intra-party competition and factionalisation within 
the dominant party, and how resources are a central element within this. It has been argued that 
the nature of SPD systems relocates political competition within the dominant party. Factionalism 
has the potential to become highly destructive, especially within former liberation movements, due 
to a multitude of interests being present. Factionalisation can become so destructive that the party 
deteriorates from within.  
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Hence, the interaction between three components has been identified to explain why resources 
have limited explanatory power for sustained dominance. Factionalisation leads to intra-party 
competition for resources, and these factions become dependent on a steady and increasing stream 
of resources to sustain their power. This can have catastrophic effects on the economy. Secondly, 
as these resources become less available, intra-party competition becomes even fiercer. Moreover, 
the party becomes unable to provide adequate service delivery and public goods. It has been 
claimed that the democratic elements within South Africa increase public awareness. As the 
economy shatters and the party deteriorates from within, the public becomes more aware of what 
is happening. Consequently, the misuse of public resources within the context explained above 
increases voter dissatisfaction and eventually electoral decay. These findings show that resources 
are not independent from the internal and external environments, indicating that resources in 
themselves cannot explain SPD.  
6.4 Explaining ANC Dominance  
This thesis has identified a number of potential weaknesses in Greene’s theory, and to wit his 
theory has not been confirmed by the South African case. It is questionable whether resource 
advantages are the only explanatory factor for one-party dominance. In fact, resources might even 
have a negative effect on dominance under certain conditions. The main findings of this thesis 
indicate that the Resource Theory does not adequately acknowledge the consequences of the 
internal politics within the dominant party. This is rooted in the theory’s assumptions of the nature 
of SPD systems, in which the dominant party is seen as a cohesive unit. By exploring how 
factionalisation manifests itself within the dominant party, and especially in former liberation 
movements, the thesis has identified how resources can decrease voter loyalty.  
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